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Thesis Abstract 
Early in 2001 the federal government tabled Bill C-11, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(IRPA), new comprehensive legislation intended to overhaul Canadas immigration laws. By this time, 
refugees had become singled out above other classes of immigrants as a threat to Canadian national 
security because a backlog of applicants had permitted thousands of failed refugee claimants to remain in 
Canada and allowed a small number of undesirable individuals to commit serious crimes and to plan and 
support terrorist activities.  This led to public concern that refugees were a potential threat to public 
safety, national security, and even Canada-US relations.  As a result, there were calls for Canada to 
tighten up its refugee system by adopting a more restrictive adjudication process for refugee claims. At 
the same time, there were calls for Canada to maintain a fair and open refugee system.  This thesis uses 
discussions from parliamentary committees, an ethical analysis of the right of liberal states to exert 
sovereignty at the expense of their obligation to protect refugees, and key provisions in both the 1976 
Immigration Acts and IRPA, to compare how the two important public goods discussed above, the rights 
of refugees and the need to protect national security, were balanced in the IRPA.  Three major research 
questions guide this analysis: What provided the impetus for extra legal and security provisions in the 
IRPA related to refugees? Did amendments in the IRPA constitute a fundamental change to Canadas 
refugee determination system? Did the IRPA strike a right balance between safeguarding the rights of 
refugees and safeguarding national security? These questions represent key elements of the refugee/ 
security nexus, a problem that the IRPA was designed to address. My thesis finds that for the most part 
the IRPA provided a balanced legislative response to this problem and that it protected the rights of 
refugees and moderately enhanced provisions related to public safety and national security, although for 
the latter it did not constitute a marked improvement, nor for the former did it address the outstanding 
issue of security certificates.  But these two deficiencies in the IRPA serve to highlight the inherent 
tension Canada has had enacting security measures while maintaining fundamental rights for refugees in a 
changing geo-political environment. 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
 
1.0 Background 
 
  
In Canada, immigration and refugee policies are treated as more than management 
strategies; many see them as being a defining characteristic of Canada.1 The political rhetoric 
of immigration used in Canadian political discourse proclaims that Canada is seen by the world as 
a nation that welcomes newcomers, promotes the unification of families, tries to maximize the 
economic benefits of immigration, and endeavours to treat justly both new immigrants and 
refugees.  For example, Joe Fontana, the Chair of the House of Commons Standing Committee 
on Citizenship and Immigration, addressed the committee on its first meeting of the 37th 
Parliament, 1st Session (March 2001) with the following statement:  
I think we have a great opportunity, as a committee and as a Parliament, for the 
first time in 30 years to strike a new immigration act and refugee act for this 
country. We all know that immigration has been an absolutely positive asset in 
helping build this country over the past 130 years or so, and that Canada has a 
proud history and tradition of compassion for those bona fide refugees who have 
been persecuted in their own lands. And so we have a great opportunity, working 
together as a committee and as a Parliament, I believe, to strike the new 
immigration act for the new century to help build our country. 2 
Rather then seeing the immigrant as a threat to the nation-state, Margaret E. Beare writes, 
Canada recognizes that immigration is a vital tool for social, cultural and economic nation-
building.3 These statements demonstrate how immigration is often discussed in terms of it being 
an elevated Canadian social value. Nevertheless, throughout their history Canadians have 
struggled with finding the right balance between the rights and safety of immigrants and refugees 
and the national security and safety of the country.  
                                                        
1 The Honourable Denis Coderre, 2003 Annual Immigration Plan, (Ottawa: Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, 2003) 3. 
2 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Standing, Committee on Citizenship and Immigration,  Minutes 
of Proceeding, (Meeting No.2, March 1, 2001), 37th Parliament, 1st Session. (Online), available at:  
http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublications.aspx?SourecId=54458&PARLSES:371&JNT=0&COM
=212. [July 30, 2004].  
3 Margaret E. Beare, Policy with a National Security Agenda, Paper prepared for Heritage Canada, 
Commissioned Paper, (February, 2003), 14. 
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The relationship between safeguarding the rights of immigrants and refugees and safe-
guarding the national and public security of Canada has been a longstanding issue in Canadian 
history; both historians and political scientists have explored these two subjects.4 In recent years 
that relationship came under greater scrutiny in Canada, especially after the terrorist attacks in 
New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. The impetus for such scrutiny stems not only 
from concerns about threats to national and public security as a result of the terrorist attacks in the 
United States and elsewhere prior to and after 2001, but also from growing concerns regarding 
the threats to the rights and safety of refugees and immigrants because of changes to government 
policy and the growing exploitation of asylum-seekers by criminal organizations and other 
unscrupulous individuals who profit financially from international migration movements and 
refugee flows.5 The issues of refugees, security and rights have been discussed, interrelated and 
more fully explored under the topic of protection: a concept related both to protecting Canada 
from those who are dangerous and who illegally access our country and its refugee determination 
system, and to protecting access to Canada for the genuinely persecuted who have a claim to our 
protection.    
These concerns were reflected in the provisions of Bill C-11, the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) which became law in 2002. The IRPA marked the federal 
                                                        
4 See for example, Reg Whitakers, Double Standard, and Bohdan Kordans, Enemy Aliens, Prisoners of 
War: Internment in Canada During the Great War.  
5 In 1999 when four boats carrying Chinese migrants arrived off the shores of British Columbia, the debate 
over immigration and refugee policies was intensely rekindled. Some 600 Chinese migrants survived 
arduous conditions, but arrived without documents, and most claimed refugee status. The public reacted 
negatively when it was revealed that the recruitment of these migrants was facilitated by criminal 
organizations; and, even though most had claimed refugee status in Canada, their intended destination was 
New York City. Almost all of these claimants were detained pending their hearings; the government feared 
that they would either flee or be harassed by the criminal agents that had facilitated their arrival into 
Canada. Once again, the immigration policy of the government, which had been since 1993 administered 
by the department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), was placed under intense scrutiny: both 
for its protection policies for refugee claimants and for its security policies for Canadian citizens. See, Joan 
Leishman, Immigration: Searching for Safety, Produced by the National, (Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation; Toronto, November 26, 2001), available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/national/indepth/immigration. [February 16, 2004].  
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governments first major overhaul in twenty-four years of the legislation and regulations that 
govern Canadian immigration policy. Contrary to conventional thinking, the IRPA was not 
enacted in response to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, which one commonly referred to 
as 9/11. Although the IRPA did not come into force until June 22, 2002, the statute was actually 
formulated, debated, and approved at the third reading stage in the House of Commons before 
9/11. However, at the time of the terrorist attack on 9/11, Bill C-11 had still not been approved by 
the Senate.  Nonetheless, legislators and the public had already begun to debate the question of 
whether some refugees posed a national security threat, and if they did, how could Canada 
maintain an open and fair refugee determination system and still protect its citizens. This thesis 
will mimic the same debate and will pose three central research questions: What provided the 
impetus for extra legal and security provisions in the IRPA related to refugees? Did amendments 
in the IRPA constitute a fundamental change to Canadas refugee determination system? Did the 
IRPA strike a right balance between safeguarding the rights of refugees and safeguarding national 
security?   
In order to answer to these questions one has to look at events that preceded the IRPA.  
Before it made it through third reading in the Senate and then again before it was proclaimed, 
considerable attention was devoted to the IRPA to determine whether its provisions sufficed to 
safeguard not only Canadas national and public security, but to some extent also American 
national and public security. The reason for this is that notwithstanding the fact that none of the 
19 hijackers involved in the September 11th attacks entered across the Canadian border, some 
U.S. and Canadian media reports depicted Canada as a haven for terrorists who exploited 
Canadas comparatively liberal refugee and immigration system.6  
The refugee policies of both countries had elicited, and continue to elicit, concern about 
their security implications. Of particular concern for the American government is that Canada, 
                                                        
6 See, for example, the April 28, 2002 60 Minutes segment on CBS TV, North of the Border, about 
terrorism and Canadas immigration and refugee system. 
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unlike the United States, has not had a policy of detaining asylum seekers until their cases are 
heard. As a result, Canadian refugee policy was perceived as having serious monitoring and 
control problems because, on average, each year approximately 10,000 failed refugee claimants 
who had exhausted their appeals had not shown up for their scheduled hearings and others had 
disappeared without informing authorities.7 Such data, combined both with the terrorist events 
prior to, on and after 9/11 and the cumulative effects of countless critiques of the immigration and 
refugee determination system during the previous two decades created extensive concerns in 
Canada and the United States regarding the adequacy of the measures to safeguard Canadas 
national and public security. This is still true in the aftermath of 9/11. For example, an article 
published in 2006 in the New Republic stated: 
Meanwhile, Canada, which prides itself on having a more tolerant society than the United 
States, created one of the world's most generous systems of asylum. In the Canadian 
asylum system, few refugees are turned away, the interpretation of political asylum is 
extremely broad, and, until very recently, the government almost never detained refugees 
who could not prove their identity. This generosity has allowed undocumented migrants to 
stay in Canada, without government surveillance, for years before a status hearing. As a 
result, Canada takes in roughly twice as many refugees and immigrants, on a per capita 
basis, as the United States. Once in Canada, these refugees can take advantage of the 
generous welfare system.8  
     
This perception of Canadas asylum system has been fueled by reports that not enough 
has been done to check the security risk of prospective immigrants, thus allowing terrorists to 
enter Canada easily and by extension to threaten the security of the United States. Media stories 
and polling data that helped to reinforce these perceptions include the following:  
D.L. Brown conjoined the refugee and security issue in his article, Attacks 
Force Canadians to Face Their Own Threat, in The Washington Post (23 
September 2001: A36). J. Bagole et al echoed the same perception in The Wall 
Street Journal on 24 September 2001. In Canada, many media reports shared the 
same sentiments. Stewart Bell wrote an article in the National Post entitled, A 
                                                        
7Aristide Zolberg, Guarding the Gates in a World on the Move, Social Science Research Council, 
(November 2001), available at: http://www.ssrc.orgsept11/essays/zolberg_text_only.htm. [July 12, 2005], 
n.pag.  
8 Joshua Kurlantzick, Terrorism Suspect: Canadas Terrorism Problem, The New Republic Online, 
(Posted July 6, 2006), available at: 
http://magazines.enews.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060605&s=Kurlantzick060706. [March 7, 2007]. 
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conduit for terrorists (13 September 2001). Diane Francis wrote about, Our 
neighbours upset over our loose refugee system in the Financial Post (22 
September 2001). A poll conducted for the Council for Canadian Unity indicated 
that the support for reduced immigration rose after 9/11 from 29% to 45%. 
However, an even larger percentage, 80% according to Léger Marketing, 
demanded stricter controls over immigration.9 
  
Even though many in the media correctly reported that none of the terrorists involved in 9/11 had 
entered the United States via Canada, the coverage and polling cited were revealing regarding the 
relationship between support for the immigration and refugee intake program and how Canadians 
feel that their personal safety and security are affected by the latter. More specifically, it revealed 
that support for immigration and its value for Canadians could be weakened if it is viewed as a 
security risk. The media coverage cited above also demonstrated that for many within the media 
and in the public, the issue of security and immigration has been co-joined with asylum policy 
and its link to terrorist activities.  
 Such suspicion leads to arguments in favour of limiting the rights of refugees.  
In addition, national security concerns have increased in recent decades with an increase in the 
number of refugee claims made within Canada, a process commonly referred to as making an 
inland claim. During the past decade, concerns have been articulated regarding the link between 
refugees and national security. First, the government has been criticized for not having control of 
its refugee determination system and by extension its border. This perception has existed even 
though since the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) was established in 1989 there has been a 
formal security screening process for all refugee claimants who receive status in Canada. 
However, before the IRPA, inland refugees, unlike those who applied from abroad, were not 
                                                        
9 Howard Adelman, Governance, Globalization, and Security: the Harmonization of Immigration Policy 
Canada and the United State, (Draft Paper, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations conference, 
Globalization, Multilevel Governance, Democracy: Continental, Canadian, and Global Perspectives, May, 
2002, Kingston Ontario), available at: http: www. iigr.ca /conferences /archives /pdfs1/ adelman.pdf. 
[August 4, 2005], 11.  
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submitted to a formal security check for criminal and terrorist backgrounds until they received 
refugee status.10  
The lack of a front-end security check for inland claimants was criticized by those on the 
security and control side of the refugee issue who argued that a reasonable certainty about the 
identity of those trying to get into the country through a refugee claim should be established 
before claimants were permitted to make their claims. The Auditor General reported in 2003 that 
almost 60 percent of refugee claimants in 2002 had presented false documents on arrival or 
reported when making their claims that they had lost their documents before entering Canada.11 
This situation represented a security concern because the refugee hearing process on average took 
between two to three years to complete. Critics of the refugee screening system charged that, 
together, the uncertainty around the identity of certain claimants and length of time to process 
claims weakened the integrity of the Canadian refugee system from a security standpoint. 
Another security concern for critics of the refugee system was the fact that annually 15 percent of 
referrals to the IRB had not shown up for their hearings.12   
Refugee advocates have countered that one of the reasons that refugees either do not have 
documents or have fraudulent ones upon arrival is because they are fleeing civil war or political 
oppression. This can make it nearly impossible for refugees to get passports or visas, and under 
certain circumstances requires them to use false documents. Furthermore, refugee claimants get 
rid of their fraudulent documents before making their claims, in order not to jeopardize their 
chances of being accepted.13 Nonetheless, without such documents it is difficult to verify the 
identity of those making refugee claims in Canada and a long determination process ensues. This 
problem is compounded because many claimants have never been fingerprinted and some of them 
use different names. In addition, it is difficult for officials to conduct security screening quickly 
                                                        
10 Martin Collacott, Canada Still Soft on Terror, Fraser Forum, (May, 2004), 9. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Leishman, Immigration: Searching for Safety, n.pag. 
13 Ibid.   
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and accurately when they cannot obtain the information from the applicants country of origin 
because either the government in that country does not have the capacity to produce such 
documents or, in many circumstances, it is reluctant to provide them, especially since it is being 
accused of persecuting the person applying for asylum in Canada.14  
Another major criticism leveled at the refugee determination system was the lack of 
adequate detention of refugee claimants. Critics suggested that the imperatives of administrative 
procedures and Canadian jurisprudence discourage the detention of refugee claimants until their 
case had been heard. Part of the reason for this is that Canadas international treaty obligations 
prohibit the detention of refugee claimants. The result of these procedures and protocols is that it 
is difficult for officials to detain refugee claimants, even those suspected of being a security 
concern.15  These concerns have sometimes been warranted, as in the examples of international 
terrorists and criminals using the Canadian refugee determination system to gain entry into 
Canada, and for using Canada as a base to support their causes.16  
The aforementioned security issues do not alter the fact that since 1946, Canada has 
accepted thousands of displaced persons, and since 1976 has formally defined humanitarian 
concerns as a priority in its Immigration Act.17 In addition, government policy to deal with 
security concerns associated with the refugee system must adhere to the constitutional rights 
regime in Canada fully entrenched through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As Reg Whitaker 
explains,  
In 1985 the Supreme Court, in the case of Singh vs. the Minister of Employment and 
Immigration, ruled that anyone, including non-citizens, subject to the application of 
Canadian law could avail themselves of the protection of the Charter of Rights. The import 
of this decision can hardly be overestimated. Governments now found themselves much 
more constrained than in the past in setting policy.18 
       
                                                        
14 Ibid. 
15Reg Whitaker, Refugees: the Security Dimension, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, (1998), 417.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Reg Whitaker, Canadian Immigration Policy Since Confederation, Canadas Ethnic Groups Booklet, no. 
15, (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1991), 21.  
18 Ibid., 23. 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that Bill C-11 contained provisions both to refuse inland refugee 
claimants perceived as security risks as well as to make provisions geared towards maintaining 
Canadas obligation to accept genuine refugee claimants fleeing persecution. Such provisions 
reflected the dual thrust of the new immigration Act implied in the double entendre inherent in its 
title which explicitly indicates that the statute deals with refugee and immigrant protection but 
leaves it to the reader to determine precisely who or what is being protected, and from whom. 
More specifically, it leaves it to the reader to determine whether it is designed to protect 
immigrants and refugees, Canadian citizens, Canadian national security or, possibly all of those. 
The objective in the remainder of this chapter is to outline the importance of this thesis, the 
analytical framework, the sources of information, and how it is organized. 
 
1.1 Objective and Research Question(s)  
 
The central objective of this thesis is to examine what can be described as the dual thrust 
of the IRPA regarding safeguarding the rights and safety of refugees and safeguarding national 
security and public safety in Canada. More specifically the objective is to examine the 
relationship between the federal governments international obligation to protect refugees, and its 
responsibility to protect both the national security and the public safety of its citizens and 
permanent residents. Although some attention is devoted to the relevance of the IRPA both for 
immigrants and refugees, the principal focus will be on refugees. The decision to focus on 
refugees, rather than both immigrants and refugees, is based on the fact that the latter more often 
than the former, have been characterized as a security threat in Canada. One of the main reasons 
for this perception is that the nature of a UN Convention refugee claim can arouse suspicion by 
citizens, politicians, and bureaucrats in host countries. As Reg Whitaker explains:  
 9
[a] well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion arises out of political 
conflicts that are unlikely to be contained within the country of origin. Spread of 
such conflicts to the host country is always a fear, and in the age of international 
terrorism and the global telepolitics of violence, this fear is not always 
imaginary.19       
 
Citizens within refugee receiving states like Canada can at times be suspicious of those who seek 
protection on grounds of political persecution.  This thesis will tries to examine how the IRPA 
dealt with the public suspicion of refugees and if it was justified to some extent in addressing this 
issue.  To this effect, the three research questions that will guide this thesis are as follows: What 
provided the impetus for extra legal and security provisions in the IRPA related to refugees?  Did 
amendments in the IRPA constitute a fundamental change to Canadas refugee determination 
system? Did the IRPA strike a right balance between safeguarding the rights of refugees and 
safeguarding national security? These questions represent key elements of the refugee/ security 
nexus, a problem that the IRPA was designed to address and that is a subject in the next section.    
      
1.2 The Importance of the Thesis 
 
Although this thesis is a case study on the reformulation of immigration and refugee 
policy in Canada, its focus and findings have implications beyond Canada. In an era of security 
and globalization, with the free movement of people and goods at unprecedented levels, the 
question of how countries confront the ethical demands that immigration and refugee movements 
represent for their sovereignty is now high on the policy agenda of many national governments. 
Countries are faced with the question of what constitutes a reasonable and just response on their 
part in trying to meet their treaty obligations towards foreign asylum seekers. The response to 
such demands has varied from country to country. Canadas approach to the admission and 
treatment of refugees, like that of many other nations, has been based on principles embodied 
both in domestic laws as well as in international conventions and protocols to which they are 
                                                        
19 Reg Whitaker, Refugees: the Security Dimension, 416. 
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signatories.20 However, the principles and obligations outlined in these agreements are 
contentious, for they deal with the obligations and limits of state sovereignty.  
For the most part the debate over the refugee/security nexus has been divided between the 
supporters of open cosmopolitan migration policies and supporters of realist state-centric 
migration polices. At the centre of the refugee/security nexus is the ethical consideration of 
whether greater controls over refugee admittance compromise states responsibilities to UN 
Convention refugees; the meaning of the word protection and how it applies to refugees is the 
contested issue in this debate. Howard Adelman outlines two leading ideological positions in this 
debate as the following: 
Cosmopolitans, who appear to predominate in the research field of refugee 
studies, push global and less restrictive measures that will liberalize access of 
migrants, particularly refugee claimants, to entry to a state. Liberal neo-realists 
try to construct improved bilateral and multilateral regimes that will do a better 
job for the state in exercising its sovereign prerogative to select entrants and 
members while, at the same time, providing protection to genuine convention 
refugees.21 
 
The two ideological positions discussed above will be the touchstone from which the 
refugee/security issue and its relation to the IRPA will be explored. Moreover, this thesis will 
examine whether the IRPA signified a shift in how Canada viewed the potential threat of asylum-
seekers, and if so whether it was justified in adopting this position.  
It is clear that security issues affect public support for immigrant and refugee programs in 
Canada.  Furthermore, the refugee determination system has come under fire as a possible threat 
to Canadas security for failing to guard against individuals associated with terrorism and serious 
criminality. By examining the security measures in the IRPA one can gain a better understanding 
of how the government and other actors interpreted and planned to address the criticisms 
                                                        
20 The 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees has served as the basis for Canadas fundamental 
commitment to provide protection to migrants in refugee like situations. Canadas commitment to provide 
non-citizens the same access to Charter rights, as well as its recent incorporation of the UN Convention 
against Torture into the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act are another two legal instruments 
that refugee claimants can use in order to obtain protection from the Canadian state.       
21 Howard Adelman, Towards Harmonization: the Effective Functioning of Asylum and Humanitarian 
Policies, Research Needed Concerning Policy and Program Development, (Paper prepared for the fifth 
National Metropolis Conference, October 16-20, 2001), 3. 
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associated with Canadas refugee determination system.  Furthermore, this line of inquiry can 
help to deduce whether the charges against Canadas asylum system are warranted. 
Furthermore, a related purpose for examining the security provisions in the IRPA is to 
help determine whether Canada has abrogated its commitment to both domestic and international 
laws that protect refugees and those who face persecution for the sake of better management of its 
asylum system. During the debate over Bill C-11, critics charged that the security measures in the 
IRPA were draconian and out of step with Canadian values. However, many of the measures 
cited in the new Act had already been enacted in previous legislation but had not been enacted in 
the regulations that governed the previous Immigration Act (e.g., the Safe Third Country 
Agreement).22 Still other security measures prescribed by the new Act had been recommended by 
all-party parliamentary reports just prior to the tabling of Bill C-11, such as security checks for all 
asylum claimants, and greater use of detention for asylum claimants without identification or with 
false identification. This thesis will compare how these kinds of security provisions measure up 
against some of the most salient normative positions that underlie the debate about security and 
refugees.  
 
 
                                                        
22 Bill C-55, which was introduced in 1987, contained controversial safe third country provisions whereby 
immigration officers were given the right to refuse the entry of claimants arriving from safe third 
countries. By the mid-1980s safe-third country agreements had been reached between numerous 
signatories of the UN and Geneva Conventions on refugees. These agreements were intended to provide 
some order to global refugee movements by ensuring that refugees made their claims in the first country in 
which they were able to safely claim refugee status. Proponents of the provision argued that these 
agreements were in keeping with the legal intention of the Geneva and UN Conventions. Furthermore, they 
argued that these agreements help to prevent what was termed as asylum shopping, whereby asylum-
seekers who were rejected in one country moved to another in the hopes of being accepted. Opponents 
argued, however, that Canada and other countries were abrogating their responsibility to refugees and 
potentially placing them in danger by sending them to be reviewed by less refugee-friendly determination 
systems. Under Bill C-55 cabinet was provided with the statutory authority to draw up a list of acceptable 
safe third countries but chose not to because of public pressure. Since one third of refugees entered 
Canada via the United States, and since the United States would have been on the list of safe countries, 
Canada would have been obliged to refuse the claims of these refugees. Bill C-55 gave precedence to 
humanitarian concerns over the need to better manage the asylum system; and after extensive debate, Bill 
C-55 was amended without an official safe third country list. See Kelley and Trebilcock, p. 415-16. 
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1.3 Analytical Framework 
 
In an attempt to provide a relatively comprehensive explanation of both the factors which 
shaped the IRPA and how it balanced the need to protect refugees and the need  to protect the 
public, this thesis provides an analysis of each of the following: the philosophies underlying the 
refugee policies of countries such as Canada; the historical basis of the modern security measures 
in Canadian law; the link between refugees and terrorism in Canada; and the relevant security 
measures in the IRPA that affected asylum-seekers and refugees. Admittedly, this approach is 
only capable of producing a rough portrait of the security and protection measures in Canadas 
most recent immigration legislation. Hopefully, it provides a useful starting point for the analysis 
of this important policy issue.  
In particular, these sources provide more useful analysis than only focusing on either 
media or academic accounts of the refugee/security determinants that affected the IRPA. David 
C. Corbett, one of the first scholars dedicated to the study of Canadian immigration policy, 
cautioned against making broad assertions about national attitudes towards immigration. In his 
1957 book, Canadas Immigration Policy: A Critique, Corbett commented on the difficulty of 
pinpointing national sentiment concerning either the nature of immigration and refugee flows or 
government immigration and refugee policy.23  In keeping with Corbetts suggestion, this thesis 
hypothesizes that there are multiple factors such as current normative theory and historical 
precedent that influence the content and adoption of modern immigration legislation like the 
IRPA.  
1.4 Information Sources 
 
The information for this thesis is derived from several sources. Government documents 
are one of the key primary sources for this thesis and include reports produced by the Auditor 
General, and House of Commons and Senate reports that dealt with the issue of security and 
                                                        
23 David C. Corbett, Canadas Immigration Policy: A Critique, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1957), 36. 
 13
refugees before and after Bill C-11 was introduced in Parliament. Other government sources 
include documents produced both by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the 
department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and two background research papers 
produced by the Library of Parliament, one on Bill C-11 and one on Canadas refugee system. In 
general, government sources provided information about the structure and content of Canadas 
refugee determination system, how protection and security issues have been framed within 
Canadian immigration legislation, and how these issues were addressed in the new law.  
The second major source of information in this thesis includes academic commentaries, 
newspaper reports, and studies produced by research institutes. These sources provided valuable 
information about the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the wider philosophical and 
normative aspects of providing refugee protection in the current geopolitical context.   
1.5 Organization 
 
The remainder of this thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter two focuses on the 
immediate philosophical positions that were involved in the production of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Providing the normative context for the provision of refugee 
protection by liberal democracies is the objective of this chapter. To this end it will present the 
two leading philosophies of immigration in liberal states in order to provide a theoretical basis for 
understanding the normative cross-pressures of the refugee/security nexus. The two philosophical 
positions often cited in relation to migration policy are communitarian and liberal perspectives; 
they afford a perspective from which to examine key security provision in the new Act.  
Chapter three provides an overview and analysis of the impetus for enacting the IRPA. 
For that purpose, it highlights how and why the inland refugee determination system has been 
directly associated with the public safety and security concerns in Canada. This chapter 
documents the historic rise in inland refugee claims in the 1980s and how this affected the 
management and control of the refugee/security issue in Canada. The debate surrounding the 
legislative amendments enacted prior to 2001 to deal with immigration and refugee related 
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security issues will also be analyzed in this chapter. This will serve as a point of reference for 
understanding the purposes of various protective measures embodied in the IRPA. Then specific 
examples of security breaches associated with the refugee system will be presented. Special 
attention is devoted to the threat of terrorism and how it has affected Canadas refugee, 
immigration and foreign policies. Furthermore, this chapter examines how the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Immigration viewed the national security and refugee issue 
just before Bill C-11 was introduced and before public opinion was tainted by September 11. The 
Committees Report, Refugee Protection and Border Security: Striking a Balance presented an 
all-party perspective of how parliamentarians and the government felt about this issue. It also 
underlined the major positions and issues at play in the debate over the meaning of protection in 
Canadian immigration policy and had a direct impact on how the government drafted the IRPA.    
Chapter four focuses on the security/protection measures contained in the IRPA. More 
specifically, it provides an overview and analysis of how the protection of immigrants and 
refugees was framed and balanced against changes made to the refugee determination system 
under Bill C-11 and the previous 1976 Immigration Act. In providing that analysis, the chapter 
concludes with commentary provided by the Senate Committees hearings on Bill C-11 which 
were held only a few weeks after the events of September 11, a period in which the 
refugee/security issue was very prominent.  
Chapter five provides a summary and analysis of the major findings. In analyzing the 
findings, the central focus is on the lessons learned regarding the array of security factors that 
influenced the focus, nature and scope of immigration and refugee policy in Canada at the turn of 
the 21st century. Furthermore, the concluding chapter will discuss the effect that the IRPA has had 
both on due process in the refugee determination process, and on striking a balance between 
protecting, both Canadians and refugees.  The chapter will highlight how the IRPA maintains 
both Canadas international obligations to provide protection and its humanitarian traditions, and 
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the discretionary power of the Canadian to state restrict access to its territory by foreign nationals, 
refugees included, who may pose a threat to its public safety and security.       
 
 16
Chapter 2:  
Philosophical Values of the Refugee/Security Nexus 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This thesis is attempting to answer the following questions: What provided the impetus 
for extra legal and security provisions in the IRPA related to refugees? Did amendments in the 
IRPA constitute a fundamental change to Canadas refugee determination system? Did the IRPA 
strike a right balance between safeguarding the rights of refugees and safeguarding national 
security? In order to properly answer these questions one has to explore the principles and moral 
obligations outlined in agreements that Canada is a signatory to regarding refugees.  These 
agreements have outlined Canadas ethical responses to refugee issues, including the 
refugee/security nexus.  The refugee/security nexus is a fundamental issue for every country 
because the states ability to decide to whom it will or will not grant asylum is integral to its 
ability to exercise sovereignty.24 As Peter Nyers explains:  
Since Hobbes, the modern state has asserted a monopoly over matters of security, 
claiming to protect citizens from both each other (through laws and police) and 
from external aggression of other states (through military, border, policing, 
etc.)This monopoly we know is a crucial source for sovereign power.25   
 
When the issue of protection has been contested in the field of immigration policy, it has either 
reshaped or maintained what Nyers states are, the traditional terms of political community.26  
Consequently, one of the most important aspects of the legal debate over protection in 
immigration law is, according to Reg Whitaker, the fact that it draws a line between 
individual and group rights on the one hand and security on the other.27 This is a particularly 
important issue where the rights of immigrants and refugees confront the right of the community 
to be protected from any threat that the former might pose.28  This issue challenged the drafters of 
                                                        
24 Peter Nyers, Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-Deportation Movement, 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 6, 1071. 
25 Ibid., 1071. 
26 Ibid., 1070. 
27 Reg Whitaker, Refugee Policy After September 11: Not Much New, Refuge, vol. 20(4), 30. 
28 Ibid.  
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the IRPA because it addressed matters affecting fundamental rights and freedoms. The two most 
important rights addressed in that legislation were the right to make a claim for refugee 
protection, and the right of the community to be protected from the possible threat represented by 
violent or false refugee claimants. Both rights involve fundamental legal principles embodied in 
immigration law such as a states right not to admit foreigners, to detain and to arrest non-
citizens, and to justify in special circumstances the non-disclosure of evidence used to detain and 
arrest individuals, as is the case with security certificates.  At the same time immigration law also 
prescribes the states responsibility to accept genuine refugees and the principles associated with 
the United Nations Geneva Refugee Convention, such as non-refoulement, the obligation not to 
return a refugee to a country where they could face torture or a risk to their life.    
These rights are representative of values enshrined in most national immigration laws. 
This chapter examines how these values are expressed in the broad meta-narrative of immigration 
and refugee policies in liberal democracies. Presenting the values and the principles embodied in 
immigration law will help to elucidate the debate about Canadas dual responsibility to protect 
refugees and to protect the security for its citizens. It also examines two leading ethical 
perspectives used to analyze refugee legislation--- liberal and communitarian philosophical 
positions. These two philosophies provide a touchstone from which to examine how liberal 
democracies balance humanitarian concerns and state sovereignty while determining their 
responsibility toward immigrants and refugees. An explanation of these philosophical positions 
will shed light on the normative cross-pressures regarding the rights of the state and the rights of 
refugees in the IRPA.      
2.1 Values and Immigration 
 
The environmental context that influences immigration law inherently involves values 
because immigration policy-making necessarily, according to Malcolm Maclaren, concerns the 
conditions of membership in a given political community [which are]never self-evident in 
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modern nation states.29 The uncertainty surrounding decisions about community membership has 
added tension to immigration and refugee policy-making as immigrant-receiving countries are 
forced to decide on whom they admit as asylum-seekers and potential citizens, and whom they 
think should remain outside of their borders.  
With over 100 million people annually since the late 1980s living outside of their original 
country of birth, decisions about community membership have increasingly confronted all 
nations.30 In 2004 the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the 
number of asylum seekers, refugees, and others of concern at over 17,000,000.31  The range of 
factors that have fueled such a high number of globally displaced people include, the flaming 
of violent civil wars, the deliberate targeting of civilian populations, and the problem of 
maintaining durable and humane state structures in conditions of poverty.32 Furthermore, 
recent advancements in communications and increased access to transportation have greatly 
expanded the number of the worlds citizens with the motivation and the means to migrate in 
order to improve their low standard of living.33 This has led to a situation where as Matthew 
Gibney explains: 
Facing few avenues for entry to the West, economic immigrants have swelled the 
ranks of asylum seekers that is, people at the borders or inside a foreign state who 
claim to be refugees in order to be admitted or remain in that state seeking to 
enter liberal democracies. As western states have recently discovered, in an 
international environment characterized by steep inequalities, it is very difficult 
to maintain protection for refugees without attracting large numbers of 
migrants.34  
 
In the face of growing numbers of asylum claims in the West, citizens in many of the 
refugee receiving countries have expressed anxieties about the economic, cultural, and political 
                                                        
29 Malcolm Maclaren, Framing the Debate over the German Immigration Bill: Toward Reasoned Policy 
Making, German law Journal, Vol.2, No. 16, (October ,2001), available at: http://www. Germanlaw 
journal.com/ article. php ?id=102 [August 3, 2005], n.pag.   
30Kelley and Trebilcock, 3.   
31 The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, Basic Facts, available at:  
http://www.unhcr.cch/cgi-bin/texis/utx/basic [June 15, 2006].  
32 Matthew Gibney, Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 1, (March. 1999), 169. 
33 Ibid, 168. 
34 Ibid.  
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costs of admitting needy strangers. As a result of these anxieties and the anxiety exacerbated by 
the dubious legitimacy of many asylum claim many states have done little more than fulfill their 
international law duty not to return to a dangerous state or territory (refouler) the seekers of 
asylum who make it to their borders.35 Furthermore, in the name of the right of a society to 
choose its own members and in defence of state security, many states have used indiscriminate 
measures such as visa and carrier sanctions,36 to prevent asylum seekers from arriving at points of 
entry. The dilemma of such a policy is that many refugees cannot secure passports or visas 
because they have fled failed states or persecuting states, and do not want their governments to 
know they are fleeing. 
     Canadas treatment and acceptance of refugees, like that of all other liberal democracies, 
has been based on principles espoused in international conventions and protocols to which they 
are signatories. The 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees has served as the basis for 
Canadas fundamental commitment to provide protection to migrants in refugee like situations. 
As part of its annual intake of refugees, Canada admits United Nations-designated displaced 
persons living in camps abroad; the largest proportion of Canadas refugee intake, however, 
comes from inland or landed claims made by people already in Canada or at one of its ports of 
entry.37  Both categories of refugees are designated under the UN Convention as individuals who, 
owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion, race, religion, 
nationality, and membership in a social group, are outside their country of nationality, and are 
                                                        
35 Ibid, 171. 
36 Visa requirements allow countries to vet foreign visitors before they arrive, thus visa requirements for 
high refugee producing countries enable countries to refuse visitors before they apply for asylum. Carrier 
sanctions are fines that states levy on international airlines and other passenger carriers for bringing 
foreigners without visas to their borders. See Gibney, 176. 
37 In 2001 the total number of refugee claimants in Canada was 27, 899: in the refugee class for that year 8, 
693 were government assisted United Nations sponsored claimants and 11, 891 were landed. Cited on the 
CIC website, Facts and Figures, available at: 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/facts2001/imdex.html#refugees [January 19, 2006]. 
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unable or, as a result of such fear, unwilling to return to it.38  However, Matthew Gibney explains 
that:  
In spite of its influence, this definition has serious limitations. For instance, it 
fails to include displaced people who have not crossed an international 
boundaryand those forced from their homeland by generalized states of 
violence rather than individual persecution.39  
 
This more expansive interpretation of what it means to be a refugee calls attention to the fact that 
often individuals are forced to flee their place of residences because of the inadequate provision 
of security where they live. According to Gibney the life and limb threatening circumstances 
that generate refugees often results from the inability of states to provide protection for their 
citizens, rather than government sponsored persecution.40     
The debate over the granting of protection to refugees has encompassed a broader 
interpretation of the legal definition of a refugee discussed above, and has continued to evolve in 
international and Canadian case law. A wider understanding of concepts like persecution, 
political opinion, religious belief, and protection has been used in the determination of refugee 
status in Canada. However, the more expansive legal definition of what it means to be a refugee 
in Canada has garnered both criticism and praise. Critics, according to Peter Rekai, maintain 
that definitions have been stretched to the point of becoming meaningless and that the lines 
between the persecuted and the economically motivated have become hopelessly blurred.41  
According to Rekai, an alternative view articulated by refugee advocates is that states which 
advocate for expanded refugee admittance, contend that the current interpretations reflect the 
realities of complex modern global politics, with its varying and often subtle forms of oppression 
and persecution.42  
                                                        
38 Gibney, 170.   
39 Ibid. 172. 
40 Gibney, footnote,170. 
41 Peter Rekai, US and Canadian Immigration Policies: Marching Together to Different Tunes, C.D. 
Howe Institute Commentary, No. 171, (November, 2002), 13. 
42 Ibid. 
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The foregoing perspectives have influenced how refugee-accepting states debate 
conflicting principles and administer their responsibilities toward asylum seekers. Moreover, the 
claims of asylum seekers have produced anxieties within and amongst liberal democracies 
primarily because of their responsibility to respect the principle of non-refoulement. This 
principle dictates that asylum seekers may reside within a states territory temporarily if they can 
reach its borders, particularly if they have legitimate claims for refuge.43 According to Gibney:   
The state thus exercises little control over who enters (whether, for instance, they 
are legitimate applicants or are considered integratable by the state) and, in the 
absence of effective preventative and deterrent measures, over how many 
claimants enter.44       
 
However, Western states have always exerted some control over the volume and nationality of 
entrants they encounter. Furthermore, they have arguably done this, at the expense of the spirit 
of non-refloulement, by issuing carrier sanctions, visas, and collective agreements45to limit the 
ability of asylum seekers to choose in which country they will apply for asylum.46  
 
2.2 Liberty, Community, and Immigration  
 
The refugee issue presents a fundamental question: if states are motivated by moral 
considerations, to what extent would they be justified in restricting the entrance of refugees in 
order to protect their national interest?  One way liberal democracies, including Canada, have 
approached the ethical dilemmas involved in immigration policy, and by extension refugee 
policy, has been to situate the issue as a choice between liberty and community as they relate 
                                                        
43 Gibney, footnote, 179. 
44 Ibid. 
45 An example of this kind of agreement is the 1991 Dublin Convention which was designed to determine 
European Member states individual responsibility for examining applications for asylum; the Geneva 
Convention did not address this matter. Therefore, the Dublin Convention was intended to uphold Member 
states responsibility in order to ensure that every asylum seekers application would be examined, unless a 
safe non-member country could consider the claim. The stated purpose of this Convention was to prevent 
situations where refugees were shuttled between states, with none accepting responsibility, as well as 
multiple or simultaneous applications for asylum by applicants. See Gibney, 178.    
46 Gibney, footnote,179.  
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to state sovereignty.47 The values of liberty and community manifest themselves in many 
definitions of state sovereignty, but according to Kelley and Trebilcock, in the context of 
immigration policy, they can be fairly readily captured.48 Ideologically, a dichotomy exists 
between supporters of open immigration who base their claim on liberty and the supporters of 
closed immigration who base their claim on community. In other words, conflict arises in the 
immigration debate when the right of individual liberty and freedom of migrants comes up 
against the right of a community to uphold its traditions, compositional integrity, and national 
security at the expense of non-citizens if need be.  
Thus, the debate over immigration in liberal democracies has tended to be conducted by 
proponents of liberal and communitarian philosophies. Proponents comprise two camps.  In the 
fist camp, contemporary liberal theory according to Malcolm MacLaren:  
may be usefully seen as comprising libertarian, social contractarian, and 
utilitarian strands The justifications vary among the strands (individual property 
rights, universal brotherhood of man, and utility, respectively) and may be 
subject to restrictions (by others rights for public order and security, and 
disutility, respectively). By emphasizing the equal moral worth of individuals, 
however, all dictate relatively open borders.49          
 
Whereas in the second camp, contemporary communitarian theory according to MacLaren: 
emphasizes in contrast the right of states to choose an admissions or rather 
exclusion policy. States like clubs and families, should on this view be free to 
determine the conditions of membership. Almost any limitations on entry that a 
state chooses to impose would be permissible.50 
 
These contesting philosophical positions confront one another in the economic, cultural, and 
humanitarian spheres of immigration policy. In the latter sphere, the issue of liberty and 
community is overtly apparent.  
          For example, the IRPA upheld the rights and freedoms associated with the liberty of non-
citizens to seek protection from the state and also the right of the community to be protected from 
                                                        
47 Kelly and Trebilcock., 5. 
48 Ibid. 
49 MacLaren, n.pag.  
50 Ibid.. 
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non-citizens. These rights were elaborated under the principles section of the new Act. In 
section three of the new Act, the Objectives and Application section, clause 3(1)(i) states that a 
principle of Canadian immigration is, to promote international justice and security by fostering 
respect for humans rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are 
criminals or security risks.51 Furthermore, clause 3(2)(c) in the Act reconfirmed the principle in 
Canada, to grant, as a fundamental expression of Canadas humanitarian ideals, fair 
consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution.52 
          Thus, Canadas newest immigration law contains provisions to support both the liberal 
objective of protecting refugees and immigrants in the community and the communitarian 
objective of protecting the community from immigrants and refugees that may pose a threat. 
Again, this points to the fact that there was a dual purpose to the word protection in Bill C-11 
and it demonstrates that the liberal position in Canadas refugee policy, at least as it is expressed 
in legislation, is closely aligned with the concept of protecting individual liberty. But also from 
the communitarian position, refugee policy permits the state to set strict limitations on who may 
enter the country.  Two thinkers involved in this debate, Joseph Carens and Michael Walzer, 
provide the basis for a more detailed analysis of Canadas and other liberal democracies 
positions on refugee policy.    
2.3 A Liberal Position: Joseph Carens 
 
Open immigration policies have been supported by liberal political theory. The liberal 
theorist, Joseph Carens, states that liberal theories generally support an open position because 
they all, begin with some kind of assumption about the equal moral worth of individuals. In 
one way or another, all treat the individual as prior to the community. Such foundation provide 
little basis for drawing fundamental distinctions between citizens and aliens who seek to become 
                                                        
51 Canada, Department of Justice, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001, c.27, (Consolidated 
Statutes and Regulations), available at: http: //laws.justice.gc.ca/en/1-2.5/64352.html, [April 12, 2005]. 
52Ibid. 
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citizens.53 Carens draws heavily from arguments in John Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971) to 
prove that liberal theory supports relatively open borders. Borrowing from Rawls but contrary to 
his own opinion, Carens discusses what an immigration policy would look like if constructed 
behind a veil of ignorance. This veil would preclude members of society when choosing the 
principles that govern it, from regarding their own and others personal situations (e.g., class, 
race, sex, personal abilities, religious beliefs, values, and so on). The purpose of the veil of 
ignorance is to eliminate the arbitrary distinctions between people that put them at odds.54 
Furthermore, the veil of ignorance imagines a hypothetical situation where people, 
deprived of knowledge about the personal circumstances of others, must make a choice between 
egalitarian principles and less egalitarian principles. Rawls hypothesized that if individuals found 
themselves in this situation they would choose broadly based egalitarian principles, compelled by 
either a sense of fairness or because it would be the best way to ensure their own interests.55 
Rawls, furthermore, believed that the decision making process that would emerge from behind 
the veil would lead to two fundamental principles: the first principle would guarantee equal 
liberty to all, and the second would allow social and economic inequalities only if they 
advantaged the least well-off in society.56  
The moral reasoning associated with the veil of ignorance, according to Carens, 
assumes that, we can take it as a basic presupposition that we should treat all human beings, 
not just members of our own society, as free and equal moral persons.57  Carens states in Aliens 
and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, that two fundamental differences that set people apart 
in this world are whether one comes from a developed or underdeveloped nation, or whether if 
                                                        
53 Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, David Jacobson (ed.), The 
Immigration Reader: America in a Multidisciplinary Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 
366. 
54 Kelley and Trebilcock, 6. 
55 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction, (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), 
239. 
56 According to Heywood, Rawls first principle reflects a traditional liberal commitment to formal 
equality, and the second principle, termed the difference principle, leads societies to adopt measures that 
promote social justice. Ibid., 239.  
57 Carens, 369-370. 
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one is an alien attempting to become a citizen. These differences are at the forefront of any debate 
over immigration policy, but they should be ignored in this kind of debate which is based on the 
principle of procedural fairness. According to Carens, Rawls first principle requires that all 
personal attributes be excluded, including nationality and citizenship, when the matter of granting 
or restricting liberties, of which national admission policies are included, is discussed. 
Accordingly, Carens believes that liberal theory would hold that immigration policy should not 
originate from a national perspective, but rather from a global view. Kelley and Trebilcock 
discussing Carens work conclude that, behind this global veil of ignorance, and considering 
possible restrictions on freedom, the perspective of those who would be most disadvantaged by 
the restrictionsin this case the perspective of the alien who wants to emigrateshould be 
adopted.58 Consequently, from this perspective, few prohibitions on immigration can be morally 
justified according to Carens.59 However, Carens arguments for open borders appear to be 
outside much of liberal theorys foundational assumptions which usually have not addressed 
questions of justice that go beyond the boundaries of a particular community or nation state. For 
example, according to Catherine Dauvergne, Rawls explicitly assumes a closed society where 
questions about immigration do not arise.60  Dauvergne clarifies that Rawls in Justice as 
Fairness: Political not Metaphysical (1985), emphasizes that his conception of justice is 
political rather than metaphysical. It is framed to apply to the basic structure of modern 
constitutional democracy, rather than to enunciate a universal truth.61 Therefore according to 
Dauvergne: 
In Rawlsian theory, the non-metaphysical society where justice is modeled is a 
closed system that one joins at birth and leaves at death. People do not enter or 
leave such a society on a permanent basis so there is no need to examine when 
and how arrivals or departures might be considered just or unjust.62      
                                                        
58 Kelley and Trebilcock, 6. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Catherine Dauvergne,  Beyond Justice: The Consequences of Liberalism for Immigration Law, 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol. 10, No. 2, (July, 1997), 326. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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Carens assertion that liberalism cannot justify a restrictive immigration policy because it 
rests on the idea that there does not exist any fundamental moral difference between individuals is 
also challenged by another important theory of Rawls, namely that liberty may be restricted for 
the sake of liberty. Rawls acknowledges that all liberties are dependent for their existence on 
public order and security.63 According to Carens, Rawls public order principle would only 
apply to immigration policy if it supported a system that was too open and by association 
threatened the stability of an immigrant receiving nation. In this situation the basic liberties of 
aliens and citizens alike in the receiving country would be diminished; therefore, some 
restrictions on the size and form of immigration to that receiving country would be justified. 
However, the public order principle does reveal Rawls privileging of a states right to uphold the 
security of its citizens over non-citizesn.  So not even liberals like Rawls would throw the borders 
wide open; indeed only natural law theory postulates the complete and unfettered freedom of 
mobility for all humans.64 
Yet Carens, like any liberal, maintains that a hypothetical possibility of a threat to public 
order would not alone justify restrictions on liberty. A threat to public order and proposed 
restrictions that would counter that threat would have to be justified by what Carens describes as, 
evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all.65  
                                                        
63 Carens, 372. 
64  Natural law theorists of the seventeenth century such as Locke, Grotius, and Vattel, believed that the 
control of territory by states opened them up to the call of necessity especially if a state possessed more 
territory than it required for its citizens. These theorists worked from the Christian assumption that the 
world was given to humankind from God for a common purpose.  This assumption did not rule out the 
establishment of private property by an individual or a state if the exercise of such property could be shown 
to be fair and in the interest of all. However, as soon as the exercising of exclusive right to property risked 
serious injury or death to another who needed the protection that that property afforded, the right to 
exclusive ownership lapsed. In this regard natural law theorists attempted to grapple with the normative 
issues raised by the communal control of territory and the disputes over entrance to that territory. See, 
Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 38-39.     
65 Carens., 373. 
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Moreover, liberties could only be restricted to the extent that they clearly do preserve 
public order. Carens claims that national security is a vital form of public order, and therefore, 
states are clearly entitled to prevent the entry of people (whether armed invaders or subversives) 
whose goal is the overthrow of just institutions. On the other hand, the strictures against an 
expansive use of the public order argument also apply to claims about national security.66 Carens 
warns against restricting the admission of immigrants from societies where liberal democratic 
values are weak based on the argument that these individuals may represent a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. He maintains that as with all issues related to public order, decisions 
should be based on reasonable expectations as opposed to hypothetical judgments. Past 
nationalist immigration policies, some of which were racist and bigoted and based on 
hypothetical speculation about the threat posed by immigrants, should give pause to any new 
policies that would discriminate on the basis of nationality and ethnicity.67 Nonetheless, in 
theorizing about justice across borders, Carens has chosen to disregard the fact that much of 
liberal thought draws a distinction between aliens and citizens. 
 
2.4 A Communitarian Position: Michael Walzer 
 
A counter perspective on immigration policy is provided by the communitarian position. 
Proponents of communitarian values assert, that in the context of immigration policy, the state 
has a right to control immigration in order to maintain its communal character.68 A well-known 
contemporary proponent of this view is the philosopher Michael Walzer. His views on 
immigration are grounded in the principle of state sovereignty. Walzer equates the self-
determination of nations to the personal autonomy of an individual: nations like individuals are 
free to decide whether and under what conditions they will enter into a relationship with a 
stranger. Commenting on Walzerss claim, Judith Shklar states, Nations are taken to be like 
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clubs, and self-determination is their right.69 In Walzers Spheres of Justice (1983), a major 
argument of the book, according to Shklar, is that the citizens of a state are entitled to have a 
government not merely of their choice, but one that shares their group identity and their 
traditional values.70 
Walzer provides a the analogy of nation states being similar to clubs in order to elucidate 
his community-centered vision of society. His concept of citizenship holds that being a citizen is 
not all that different from being a member of a club, a place where individuals bond and share 
similar outlooks and loyalties. More importantly, in a club members are free to determine the 
circumstances of membership.71 Walzer supposes: 
The distribution of membership is not pervasively subject to the constraints of 
justice. Across a considerable range of the decisions that are made, states are 
simply free to take in strangers (or not)  much as they are free, leaving aside the 
claims of the needy, to share their wealth with foreign friends, to honor the 
achievements of foreign artists, scholars, and scientists, to choose their trading 
partners, and to enter into collective security arrangements with foreign states. 
But the right to choose an admission policy is more basic than any of these, for it 
is not merely a matter of acting in the world, exercising sovereignty, and 
pursuing national interests. At stake here is the shape of the community that acts 
in the world, exercises sovereignty, and so on. Admission and exclusion are at 
the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-
determination. Without them, there could not be communities of character, 
historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special 
commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life.72 
 
From this vantage point Walzer sets up a comparison between the state as a club and the state as a 
neighbourhood. Proponents of open borders, he argues, hold the latter position toward the state. 
The complex and open form of association embodied in the concept of the 
neighbourhood is analogous to the liberties enjoyed by citizens of democratic states. Internally, 
within liberal democracies, as in neighbourhoods, there is no organized or legally enforceable 
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admissions policy. Strangers can come and go as they please and they cannot be either admitted 
or excluded. As Walzer states: 
In principle, individuals and families move into a neighborhood for reasons of 
their own; they choose but are not chosen. Or, rather, in the absence of legal 
controls, the market controls their movement. Whether they move is determined 
not only by their own choice but also by their ability to find a job and a place to 
live. Ideally, the market works independently of the existing composition of the 
neighborhood. The state upholds this independence by refusing to enforce 
restrictive covenants and by acting to prevent or minimize discrimination in 
employment.73   
 
Walzer presents a vision of liberal democratic societies granting their citizens the right to either 
enter or exit communal associations at will in order for them to protect their individual freedom 
and liberty. The analogy Walzer uses is the ability of citizens in liberal democracies to either 
move into or out of neighbourhoods. An individual citizen should have the right to live wherever 
they please; however, the reciprocal side of this argument is that current residents should have the 
ability to move out of their neighbourhood if they do not like the individuals who are coming to 
live there. This is how the liberty of both individual citizens is maintained.      
This concept, however, changes when the neighbourhood analogy is used to compare the 
relationship between states either individually or collectively and aliens as well as the relationship 
between citizens and non-citizens. Walzer postulates that if a state, like a neighbourhood, allowed 
the uncontrolled entry of aliens in any number and from anywhere, then the integrity of the state 
itself would be threatened. Using historical examples, Walzer concludes that: if states ever 
became large neighborhoods, it is likely that neighborhoods will become little states. Their 
members will organize to defend their local politics and culture against strangers. Historically, 
neighborhoods have turned into closed or parochial communities whenever membership has been 
too open.74 Employing the example of parishes in seventeenth century England, Walzer 
illustrates how members of communities closed themselves off to strangers when they themselves 
became responsible for the welfare of the community instead of the church. In this case, the 
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English parishes raised and spent welfare monies locally, but excluded newcomers from their 
communities when they became responsible for the welfare of new members.75 Examples like 
this, Walzer claims, demonstrate that only the nationalization of welfare, as well as the 
nationalization of culture and politics, allowed neighbourhood communities, and by association 
nation-states, to accept new members.76   
Neighbourhoods, then, can only be open if countries are, at least, partially closed. The 
state must choose would-be members and guarantee their loyalty, security, and welfare. This is 
the only way that local communities based on indifferent association, personal preferences, and 
market relations can form. Again, it is important to reiterate Walzers claim that if states became 
large neighbourhoods, (i.e. they had open admissions policies), neighbourhoods would become 
small states.77 As he explains:  
The politics and the culture of a modern democracy probably require the kind of 
largeness, and also the kind of boundedness, that states provide. I dont mean to 
deny the value of sectional cultures and ethnic communities; I mean only to 
suggest the rigidities that would be forced upon both in the absence of inclusive 
and protective states.78            
           
 For Walzer, membership is a social good that is constituted by our own understanding: 
its value is fixed by our decisions and we are in charge of its distribution, for it is already ours 
by birth and can only be given out to strangers.79 The principle of mutual aid is, however, 
according to Walzer the only possible external principle for an open distribution of membership: 
a principle not wholly dependent on the prevailing view of membership within a particular 
society.80 Refugees are a case for Walzer where the principle of mutual aid is most evident: 
their desperate situation morally demands that a country grant them asylum.81   
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The principle of mutual aid notwithstanding, Walzers theory appears to allow many 
justifications for states to enact entry limits. This is opposite to liberal theory, which implies few, 
if any limitations on entry. Two disputed aspects of Walzers theory are, according to Kelley and 
Trebilcok: 
the notion that political sovereignty is a near-absolute value-a view 
increasingly challenged by the evolution of human rights norms-and that only 
communities of character are those that reflect ethnic, religious, cultural, 
ideological commonalities-a view that many liberals would challenge on the 
grounds that common commitments to liberal civic institutions and mutual 
tolerance of intermediate sub-communities of interest can sustain communities of 
character.82      
 
Nonetheless, liberty and community are two core ideas associated with the relationship between 
citizens, non-citizens, and state sovereignty. Furthermore, these two ideas represent the ends of a 
philosophical spectrum that has been used to compose most developed countries immigration 
and refugee policies.83 
 
2.5 The Claims of States, Citizens, and Refugees 
 
 Both the perspective of global liberalism and the perspectives of communitarianism 
represent powerful and conflicting moral claims. State responsibilities towards refugees are 
embodied in particularism and impartialism. According to Gibney: 
particularism upholds the claims of justice of individuals as citizens, as 
members of particular political communities. Impartialism upholds the claims to 
equal concern and respect of human beings qua human beings. Both of these 
claims to justice resonate in contemporary liberal democratic thinking.84 
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The clash between these competing ethical claims, however, presents a problem when an attempt 
is made to imagine the ideal position that a state should adopt in its approach toward refugees. As 
Gibney explains: 
Each approach captures an important moral claim raised by the current crisis, but 
neither can be said to represent an adequate balance or integration of the personal 
and impersonal moral claim. In the face of large numbers of refugees and other 
needy strangers in the contemporary world, accepting the full logic of the 
impartial approach would lead to policies that undermine the conditions 
necessary for communal self-determination and the provision of public goods. 
Going with the full implications of the partial view risks legitimating the current 
actions of states in paying scant regard to the claims of millions of refugees on 
the right to communal autonomy.85 
  
The above theories are instrumental in understanding the conflated issues of justice, state 
sovereignty, and refugees but an analysis by Howard Adelman also reminds those interested in a 
just policy response to this issue that: 
Moral rules do not arise from a deductive rational moral science, but arise out of 
the interaction of precedent with experience.  The task of applying these 
principles globally is one of negotiation and development rather than a direct 
product of abstract theory. The questions of justice vis-à-vis refugee policy 
cannot be examined by comparing an ideal model of justice with the second 
rate world we live in, but rather by examining our world and how questions of 
justice, in the context of refugee policy, have actually been adjudicated. To do 
that, we must go beyond deliberations about abstract justice to elucidate the 
categories in which actual policy decisions in this field have been made.86 
  
Thus, neither the impartial-liberal nor the partial-communitarian positions fully depicts 
the moral imperatives which confront states when they deal with refugees; for these two ethical 
claims only address an ideal situation where states are free to exercise their moral agency in a 
similar fashion as individuals. In reality the moral agency of states is constrained. The state must 
first weigh the claims of citizens before considering the claims of refugees because the modern 
state according to Gibney: 
is a particularistic moral agent, constituted by a set of duties owed to its 
citizens that are integral to its authority to act. The classical formulation of these 
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responsibilities lies in the idea that states have a duty to ensure the security and 
provide the welfare of its citizens. In recent times, however, most modern states 
have come to see themselves as bound by a more stringent duty: to act in 
accordance with the wishes of their citizens, as expressed through regular 
elections;[a]t least in principle, it is now the demos who decide which 
obligation the state will pursue.87 
 
For liberal democracies, then, the politics of refugee admission reflects how each individual state 
negotiates its responsibility toward refugees and the extent to which it and its citizens feel obliged 
to respect this responsibility; Canada is no different in this regard.  
When tensions arise in liberal states over the claims of citizens versus the claims of new 
entrants, whether they are refugees or immigrants, the state will likely decide on these claims 
based on the particularistic arguments of its citizens first. The claims to less competition in 
housing, in social security, and in employment, according to Gibney, appeal to the 
understanding that citizen interests deserve to be primary in state consideration.88 Moreover, 
according to Gibney, the moral and practical obligation of liberal states to adhere to the majority 
view of its citizens is expressed through democratic politics; and, when it comes to the politics of 
refugees, a myriad of political factors can influence a states level of acceptance of new 
entrants.89  
One of the most important factors is that the receiving state ensures that new entrants do 
not pose a threat to current residents and citizens, and that the system which oversees refugee 
determination status is competently managed so as to mitigate the aforementioned risk. By virtue 
of this fact, the publics support is required for continuance of a liberal refugee policy. These 
constraints help to explain why the relationship between migration and security has come under 
greater scrutiny in Canada since 9/11.  
                                                        
87 Gibney, 175 
88 Ibid., 175. 
89 Ibid., 176. 
 34
However, this topic was already in the minds of those responsible for drafting Canadas 
most recent immigration law, the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). 
According to a Canadian Parliamentary study published in 2002: 
The government has long feared that, without control, support for all immigration 
programs would be endangered. More so, following the events of September, 11th 
2001, there was significant pressure to implement legal and administrative 
measures in order to alleviate American fears that Canadas refugee and 
immigration protection system was vulnerable to individuals and groups posing 
security risks.90 
 
Therefore, as a general conclusion, public order and security appear to be two 
extremely important factors associated with the maintenance of an open refugee and 
immigration policy.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The preceding quote demonstrates that the issue of refugees, whether the issue is framed 
as the right of individual liberty or the right of a community to set its standard of membership, is 
accentuated by domestic politics; the events of 9/11 serve to highlight this point. Furthermore, an 
important point to consider is that the need to protect and to adhere to the existing rights of 
citizens in liberal states will at times alter these states policies based on illiberal justifications. 
The issue of security and refugees poses this kind of challenge for western liberal states. For 
example, according to Michael Samer, when liberal states mobilize against threats to national 
security, liberal states act illiberally because governments believe these are threats to the very 
liberal institutions and the rule of law they seek to protect.91  
Within the context of immigration policy, when a states refugee determination system is 
perceived as being abused by illegitimate and possibly dangerous claimants, it can lead to the 
adoption of what appears to be illiberal measures by the state. This is the logic applied by states 
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to refugees when they are deemed a security threat. Exploring if and how refugees have become 
seen as a threat in Canada, and the justifications for this perception are subjects of the next 
chapter. The next chapter will also explore how refugees have become the subject of much 
controversy in Canada over the issue of ensuring whether enough appeal mechanisms are 
available to them. The latter issue demonstrates that states have become increasingly aware of 
their responsibilities towards refugees, an obligation that is recognized under international law 
and which cannot be ignored by national immigration polices.    
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Chapter 3:  
 
Factors that Provided the Impetus for and Shaped 
 the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
The first of three guiding research questions in this thesis is the following: What provided 
the impetus for extra legal and security provisions in the IRPA related to refugees? The intent of 
this chapter is to present a comprehensive analysis of the factors that prompted policy-makers and 
the federal government to introduce new expanded security and protection provisions related to 
refugee admission in the IRPA. When policy-makers and the government set out to amend the 
refugee provisions of the 1976 Immigration Act, they had to balance a number of factors but a 
priority according to Benjamin Dolin and Margaret Young was that:  
The law must embody the essence of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its Protocol.  This requires signatories not to return people in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.  The 
law must also reflect Canadas obligation under the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  Of crucial importance is the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.92   
 
This chapter explores how the issue of adhering to the Refugee Convention and international law 
became entwined with security issues and became a controversy, especially over the debate of 
maintaining appeal mechanisms and procedural fairness in the refugee determination process 
versus the need for proper program management.  
The analysis in this chapter will trace the development of this issue and pay special 
attention to six interrelated factors: the first is the procedural rules established in Canada to 
protect the rights of refugees and to ensure they have a fair hearing; the second is the 
administrative problems that the Canadian refugee determination system has had in ensuring 
procedural fairness; the third is the failure of the refugee system to adequately screen and deport 
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dangerous refugee claimants; the fourth is the rise in refugee applications from regions that have 
produced terrorist and security threats to Canada; the fifth is the effect Canadas refugee policy 
has on Canada-U.S. relations; and the sixth major factor that contributed to enhanced protection 
provisions in the IRPA was the House of Commons report, Refugee Protection and Border 
Security: Striking a Balance which was established to provide recommendations in response to 
the above mentioned security problems with the Canadian refugee system. The Report was tabled 
in the House of Commons in March 2000 and it was the most comprehensive government study 
to that date to examine the linkage between security and refugees. An analysis of that report in 
this chapter provides important insights on the respective positions of the Canadian government 
and Parliament towards the issue of security and refugees. 
 
The House of Commons report presented a picture of an asylum system in Canada that 
was under tremendous stress. The governments response to deal with this problem was to 
establish three different sets of measures under the IRPA: some dealt with access; some dealt 
with processing refugees; and, some dealt with consequences, which meant removing people who 
were denied refugee status in Canada, refugees considered dangerous or refugees who had 
committed a serious crime. The idea was to have a more orderly handling of inland refugee 
claimants, to reduce potential abuses in the system, and to strengthen public confidence in it. 
Inland claimants have represented on average 60 percent of annual refugee flows to Canada.93 
This chapter will outline how a growing number of inland refugee claims at the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (IRB) and the administrative practices that governed the processing of them led to 
a backlog in the refugee system which allowed a few dangerous people to live in Canada under 
the pretext of needing Canadas protection.    
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3.1 Problematical Procedural Rules with the Establishment of Canadas Inland Refugee 
        Determination System 
 
Refugees had no official status under domestic Canadian law until the 1976 Immigration 
Act. The 1976 Act established a Refugee Status Advisory Committee (RSAC), which was 
responsible for assessing inland refugee claims until 1989. Rejected inland refugee claimants 
could appeal to the Immigration Appeals Board (IAB), an independent administrative body that 
heard appeals of certain deportation orders. If refugee claimants or those with refugee status were 
unsuccessful at either the RSAC or the IAB, they could request leave from the Federal Court to 
review points of law or interpretation related to their failed claim or appeal.94  
Although inland refugee claimants had access to both administrative and judicial appeal 
mechanisms, the quality of the appeals recourse available to rejected claimants was criticized by 
refugee advocates. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s non-government organizations and authors 
of government-commissioned reports criticized the government for the lack of an oral hearing 
before the RSCA or the IAB.95  Critics pointed out a growing gap between the demands for 
administrative efficiency versus procedural justice.  In the 1980s Canada was becoming 
increasingly concerned with not appearing arbitrary and unfair when it came to refugees. A 
government task force in 1981 came to the conclusion that to avoid acting arbitrarily towards 
refugees, Canada had to ensure that, our refugee determination procedures reflect Canadian 
standards of procedural fairness as they had become manifest in our general concept of a fair 
hearing.96   
The Supreme Court of Canada intervened fostered more debate in 1985 with its ruling in 
Re: Singh vs. Minister of Employment & Immigration. The Court ruled that refugee claimants 
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physically present in Canada were entitled to the protection of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. As Dagmar Soennecken explains:  
Accordingly, the refugee determination procedures had to comply with the standards of 
fundamental justice set out in s.7 of the Charter. These include the right to an oral hearing. 
Successfully, the government introduced amendments first allowing for an expansion of 
the IAB, but eventually revamped the entire procedure by creating a new decision-making 
body, the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), whose productivity and rate of 
acceptance immediately proved higher than that of its predecessor. 97 
 
The Immigration and Refugee Board was established as an independent quasi-judicial tribunal, 
separate from government, though ultimately responsible to Parliament and accountable to 
Canadians through the courts. The IRB carries out three major functions: immigration inquiries 
and detention reviews; immigration appeals; and refugee determinations. These functions were 
performed by three divisions in the IRB, each with distinct functions: the Immigration Appeal 
Division (IAD), the Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD), and the Adjudication 
Division which was added to the IRB in 1993.  
 The IAD heard four types appeals on immigration matters: sponsorship appeals, 
removal orders, residency obligation appeals, and Ministers appeals of the Adjudication 
Divisions decisions in admissibility hearings.  The Appeal Division heard appeals of refusals of 
sponsored applications for permanent residence and appeals against deportation orders issued 
against permanent residents. The Division also heard appeals made by persons in possession of 
valid visas seeking admission to Canada who had been detained, reported or ordered removed at 
ports of entry. The IAD could allow an appeal and set aside an original decision if there was an 
error in law or fact or a breach in the principles of natural justice. The IAD was a court of record 
with all the powers, rights, and privileges accorded such a body.98   
The Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) was responsible for ensuring 
that the UN Convention refugee determination process and all refugee claimants were dealt with 
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fairly and expeditiously and in a manner consistent with Canadas humanitarian and international 
obligations.99 Under the Immigration Act, the CRDD was given the authority to conduct two 
types of hearings: a hearing into a claim and a hearing into a Ministers application for cessation 
hearings. Almost all of the work of the CRDD concerned hearings into claims under the former 
situation.100   A hearing into a claim before the CRDD was conducted by at least two division 
members and usually followed a "non-adversarial" format. This is evident by s. 69 of the 
Immigration Act which gave the claimant a full opportunity to participate at the hearing, but gave 
the Minister only a restricted opportunity.  According to the 1999 CRDD Handbook published by 
the IRB: 
Under subparagraph 69.1(5)(a)(i) of the Act, the claimant is given a reasonable opportunity 
to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses and make representations; under 
subparagraph 69.1(5)(a)(ii) of the Act, the Minister, in the usual case, is allowed only to 
present evidence, and is not allowed to cross-examine witnesses or make representations 
(although the Refugee Division may, if it considers it appropriate to do so, give the 
Minister a reasonable opportunity to question the claimant and any other witnesses and to 
make submissions [Immigration Act, s. 69.1(5)(b)].)
101
  
 
In practice, the Minister did not often present evidence at a hearing into a claim. The process was 
usually non-adversarial; becoming more adversarial when a representative of CIC participated in 
the case to argue against the claim. A refugee protection officer assisted the IRB member by 
ensuring that credible and relevant evidence was presented. Representatives of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees could observe any hearing. Individuals whose claims for 
refugee protection were accepted by the IRB could apply to become permanent residents of 
Canada.
102
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 The Adjudication Division conducted immigration inquiries and detention reviews for 
people believed to be inadmissible to, or removable from, Canada. The adjudicators were officials 
of the Immigration Department. This examination was also referred to as an admissibility 
interview. An admissibility interview could be conducted by CIC at a port-of-entry or at an inland 
office. If, after an admissibility interview, a person was deemed inadmissible, an admissibility 
hearing was held at the request of a CIC officer. The CIC officer had to provide a report with 
reasons as to why he or she believed that the person should not be admitted or allowed to stay in 
Canada to the CIC Minister. If the Minister believed the reasons were well founded, the report 
would be referred to the IRB for an admissibility hearing. Reasons might have included: security 
considerations, human or international rights violations, serious criminality, organized crime, 
danger to public health, financial considerations, misrepresentation, non-compliance with the Act 
and an inadmissible family member.   
IRB refugee hearings were non-adversarial, and more informal and investigatory than the 
previous RSAC process, reflecting a shared interest in establishing the facts.103 However, the 
earlier RSACs acceptance rate had averaged 25 percent while the IRB averaged 76 percent in the 
first year of its operation in 1989.104 Over the years, significant backlogs of unprocessed claims 
developed, in particular during the IRBs first few years, with 85,000 claims being processed by 
the end of 1989.105 This created long waiting periods and processing times. Since Canada has not 
enacted procedures to reject manifestly unfounded refugee claims like other major refugee 
receiving countries, which usually results in reduced appeal options, the key Canadian effort for 
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reducing backlogs and processing times was to speed up the refugee determination process by 
fast-tracking manifestly well-founded cases.106    
The need for greater capacity in processing inland refugee claimants corresponded with 
ever-increasing global refugee movements: 2.5 million by 1970, 8 million by 1980, and 18 
million worldwide by 1999.107 Government and private sponsored refugees and overseas and 
inland asylum claimants in Canada increased from 27, 900 in 1979, to 40,500 in 1980, and back 
to 27, 950 in 2001. Nearly 560,000 refugee claims were made in Canada in the last twenty years 
and in 2002, the year that the IRPA became law, refugees represented 11 per cent of total 
admissions in Canada.108 During this period there were over 10.4 million refugees worldwide.109 
Yet, the refugee determination process adopted in the 1976 Immigration Act and successive 
legislative amendments were not equipped to handle the increases in inland refugee claimants.110  
       However, during this period Canada received the prestigious UN Nansen Medal, the 
highest honour bestowed for protection of refugees, and was one of the first states to recognize 
gender-based persecution as a ground for establishing refugee status, particularly important for 
women fleeing prosecution when they do not come under the definition of refugee in the UN 
Refugee Convention.111 Canada has also been heralded as, liberal with its refugee 
determination processenshrining a humanitarian approach.112 The proponents of expanding 
procedural rights for refugees in Canada such as the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) had 
argued successfully before the courts on the need to expand protection measures for refugees in 
Canada. This was reflected in the composition and procedures of the IRB.     
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3.2 Insufficient Administrative Capacity for the Refugee Determination System  
 
Key security and protection measures in Bill C-11 relate back to the need for improved 
program management and the government being forced to change the refugee determination 
system in order to better manage access to it. Therefore, leading up to the introduction of the Bill 
C-11, the government stated that limiting the number of claimants in order to ensure the adequate 
operation of the refugee determination system in Canada was essential. This policy was 
necessitated on the premise that over half of the claimants appeared not to have been genuine in 
that they could not be indisputably deemed Convention refugees. Because of Canadian 
jurisprudence and administrative practice, no mechanism was established for the Canadian 
refugee system to reject manifestly unfounded claims; therefore, the need to process claims 
quickly became a paramount issue from a control and security standpoint, given that Canadian 
administrative practice also deterred the use of detention for refugee claimants, even if their 
identity was unknown.113   
The issue of program management and program efficiency with the refugee system 
relates back to the Singh Decision .114  Administrative and fiscal problems associated with 
meeting the requirement of the Singh decision were caused by a substantial rise in inland 
claimants designated as asylum seekers arriving in Canada in the 1980s claiming refugee status 
but whose actual UN Convention refugee status was indeterminate.115 In 1986 it was estimated 
that two-thirds of the 18,000 refugee claimants for that year were not genuine refugees.116 This 
fact also pointed to the growing involvement of commercial and criminal smuggling in the 
refugee process in Canada.117 A contributing factor for this illegal activity was the phenomenal 
rise in world refugee movements that were accompanied by improved global communications and 
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accessible transportation, and a growing gap between developed and underdeveloped nations.118 
Almost from the beginning of the implementation of the 1976 Act, these and other factors helped 
to form a backlog of claims that threatened to overwhelm the whole refugee determination 
system.119 
Two other trends emerged at the same time which contributed to problems with 
administering a growing number of claimants within the Canadian refugee determination system: 
annually since the 1990s, 15 percent of referrals to the IRB have not shown up for hearings, and 
the growing number of unexecuted removal orders of failed claimants. In 2001, there were over 
26,000 unexecuted removal orders.120  The refugee system and the IRB have been associated with 
this problem even though the prosecution of deportation orders is the responsibility of Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada and other law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, the imperatives of 
administrative practice and Canadian jurisprudence, which had not encouraged detention of 
refugee claimants and thus made it difficult for officials to keep track of claimants who were let 
free after having their claim referred to the IRB, had led to the refugee system being linked to the 
issues of failed removals, inefficiency, and security concerns. These issues were well established 
in the minds of policy-makers and the government in the lead up to Bill C-11.  
It was reported for example, that by the late 1990s, the average processing time, the 
interval between filing a claim and the IRB producing a final decision on a claim, was 13 
months.121 And in the event of a failed claim, the interval between the IRBs decision and the 
Departments assessment based on risk of return was almost 7 months, with another 10 months 
before a removal was enforced. Including the time it took to conduct a judicial review by the 
Federal Court, persons claiming refugee status in Canada could count on staying in the country 
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for more than 2.5 years while the validity of their claim was assessed.122  Furthermore, almost 
half of all claimants under deportation review did not show up for their hearings.123  
In order to handle the above mentioned factors involved in processing a refugee 
application in Canada, the refugee-determination system had placed a great deal of emphasis on 
attempting to identify, almost immediately upon arrival, whether a refugee applicant was 
admissible to Canada or not. The drafters of the IRPA foresaw the need to continue with this 
principle but also saw the need for enhanced control measures.  Two other inter-related factors 
that influenced how Canada managed increased refugee flows were the amount of resources 
allocated to the refugee system and how those resources were implemented into administrative 
practices.   
In 2001, the year that Bill C-11 the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, was passed, 
over 44,000 claims were referred to Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD), the 
administrative body within the IRB that conducted formal hearings for refugee claimants.124  That 
year, the CRDD conducted almost 23,000 full hearings.125 Sinha and Young note, however, that, 
the Board [the Immigration and Refugee Board] was originally given resources sufficient to 
conduct approximately 7,500 full hearings, based on 18,000 claims in total.126 Furthermore, 
when the IRB was created in 1989, according Dolin and Young:  
The original drafters of the legislation assumed that a large number of claims 
would be weeded out at an early stage on the basis that they were not credible, 
and that safe third country agreements would result in the immediate return of a 
significant number of claimants to the countries through which they transited.127      
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However, the assumptions of the original drafters did not materialize. An initial credibility basis 
hearing128 designed to weed out claims was abandoned in 1992, and a safe third country 
agreement with the United States, the largest transit country for Canadian refugee claimants, was 
not implemented until after September 11, 2001. Furthermore, for the three years prior to 
September 11, the acceptance rate for claims before the IRB was 58 percent, the highest rate of 
any major refugee accepting country.129  
The traditional high acceptance rate of refugee claimants in Canada when coupled with a 
lack of resources has had a cumulative effect on the operational efficiency of the IRB. This, in 
turn, opened the refugee determination system up to criticism for leaving potentially dangerous 
individuals free to live and work in Canada as they waited for their claims to work their way 
through the refugee determination system.   
 
 
 3.3 Failure to Adequately Screen and Deport Dangerous Refugee Claimants   
 
The introduction of Bill C-86 in 1992 amended the 1976 Immigration Act to include a 
provision that when a person made a refugee claim, a single official of the Immigration 
Department conducted an immediate eligibility hearing at the port of entry where the claim was 
made. At this time the claimant was asked to complete an identification form, and all available 
identification documents of the claimant were asked for by officials. The claimant was also 
fingerprinted and photographed, and then this information was forwarded to the RCMP and CSIS 
who were entrusted with the task of conducting domestic and foreign security checks on the 
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individual if they received refugee status and then applied for permanent residence. Barring 
claimants who were flagged immediately for security concerns, the vast majority were permitted 
to make a claim before the IRB, although security checks would proceed, and if a case before the 
IRB raised concerns, it could be halted.130 Nonetheless, after initial contact with Immigration 
Department officials, most claimants were delayed for only a few hours, provided with 
information about filing a claim with the IRB and then were free to enter Canada. 
Refugee claimants were subject to a conditional removal order from the time that their 
claim was made until a final decision was made by the IRB. If an unsuccessful decision before 
the IRB was rendered, refugee claimants would have their removal order considered in effect. 
Failed claimants were normally required to leave Canada soon after the decision on their claim 
was rendered. Moreover, pursuant to the regulations of the Immigration Act, there were sanctions 
for non compliance. Claimants risked having their claim declared abandoned if they did not file 
the correct documents on time. Also, claimants who did not comply with a departure order within 
30 days were issued an automatic deportation order; this virtually foreclosed legal re-entry into 
the country. And for serious violations such as not appearing for an examination, inquiry, or 
removal order, the Immigration Act permitted for an arrest warrant to be issued.131 In general, the 
Immigration Act provided procedures for the removal from Canada for all non-citizens, regardless 
of their length of residence. The most common procedures were deportations which barred a 
person from Canada for life, a twelve month exclusion order, and a departure notice for criminal 
code infractions not based on serious grounds.132  
Under the old Act, the removal process for permanent residents and individuals with 
refugee status began at the Adjudication Division where:  
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[a] designated officer presented the departments case before an adjudicator 
within the department, who would also hear the case before the person 
concerned. The adjudicators decision was appealable in most cases to the 
Immigration Appeal Board, on grounds of law, fact, or compassionate 
considerations in the case of a permanent resident.133  
 
The 1992 amendments to the Immigration Act, established circumstances that made a refugee 
claim ineligible; this meant that the claim could not be heard before the Convention Refugee 
Determination Division of the IRB. The purpose of this exclusion order was to facilitate the 
removal as quickly as possible from Canada of an individual not deemed eligible to receive 
Canadas protection. Inadmissibility clauses generally applied to those claimants considered 
dangerous criminals, persons who had already been granted refugee status in another country, 
terrorists, war criminals, and those who had been denied refugee status in Canada within a period 
of 90 days.134 
 If a claimant received a negative ruling before the IAD, extra review mechanisms were 
made available to them after a deportation order was filed against them. First, they were entitled 
to reassessment of their need for protection based on their risk of return. Second, they could also 
apply for permanent residence based on humanitarian grounds through what was designated by 
the regulations as a Humanitarian and Compassion (H&C) hearing. A failed refugee claimant 
could apply for an H&C hearing, for example, if they had a Canadian born child or Canadian 
spouse. However, even though refugee claimants had access to apply for residence based on 
humanitarian grounds at any time during the course of their claim, most appeals based on this 
kind of situation were launched only after the claimant was ordered to leave Canada. Overall, the 
Department had difficulty resolving these cases quickly which led to a slow and complex appeals 
process.135 
 The ministerial appeal process was also available to failed claimants and those who were 
ordered deported. For example, using the Ministers discretionary power to create special classes 
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of people under the Immigration Act, Bill C-86 of 1992 created a new class of persons called the 
Post-Determination Refugee Claimants in Canada Class (PDRCCC). This class was administered 
by the Department and was, designated to protect claimants who fail[ed] to meet the UN 
Conventions definition of a refugee but who nonetheless would face personal risk or harm if 
forced to leave Canada.136 The creation of this class formalized a practice that the Department 
had used since 1989. The amendment stated that in order to qualify under this class: the risk 
must be compelling consisting of a threat to life, extreme sanctions or inhumane treatment-and it 
must be personal-that is directed at the individual rather than based on a generalized situation of 
risk in the country.137 This review was available to all claimants, and previously with few 
exceptions, all claimants who failed the IRB hearing automatically had their risk of return 
reviewed by a post-claims determination officer of the Immigration Department.138 Although the 
risk criteria under review with this process appeared to be limited, this process did represent an 
expansion of the UN  Convention definition of protection previously used by Canada to assess 
asylum-seekers claims.139    
Enhanced appeal procedures for refugees garnered Canada praise on the international 
stage but by the mid 1990s these same procedures were becoming associated domestically with 
security deficiencies and lack of criminal enforcement. In the 1990s, negative attention was 
focused on the nearly 26,000 annual unexecuted deportation orders.140 Even though many of these 
orders had received a temporary stay of removal, by implication this implied abuse of the system 
by immigrants and asylum seekers and a lack of serious enforcement by the government. The 
murder of two individuals in 1994, a young woman and a police officer, both from Toronto, by a 
failed refugee claimant and a permanent resident caused a public sensation and put into question 
the efficacy of removal procedures. In one of the cases, it was revealed that a Jamaican permanent 
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resident, although ordered deported, was permitted a stay of removal by the Adjudication 
Division even though he had previous convictions in Canada for assault and weapons charges.141 
The other case involved another Jamaican refugee claimant who had been ordered deported, and 
had failed to get a stay of removal from the IAD; however, the Immigration Department failed to 
carry out his removal.142   
As a result of these sensationalized cases, the government ordered a study of the 
Immigration Appeal Division. According to Kelley and Trebilcock: 
A review of the decisions of the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration 
and Refugee Board revealed that many permanent residents who were granted 
stays in 1993 had criminal records, frequently for drug related offences, 
robberies, and assaults. Included in this group were convicted sexual offenders 
and an applicant from El Salvador who had been convicted of manslaughter.143    
 
With these findings in hand, the government felt compelled to answer for what was being 
described in the media as too much leniency in the refugee appeal process.144 In response, the 
government enacted a further amendment to the Immigration Act, with Bill C-44 in 1995. That 
piece of legislation, according to Kelley and Trebilcock: 
Addressed security concerns by making it easier to remove permanent residents 
with a serious criminal background. Those who had been convicted of a serious 
criminal offence in Canada, defined as one carrying a sentence of ten years or 
more, would be denied the right to appeal a removal order to the IRB or to 
submit a refugee claim to the CRDD, if the minister was of the opinion they 
constituted a danger to the public in Canada, and the processing of permanent 
residents citizenship applications would be suspended pending the outcome of 
any Immigration Act proceedings.145   
 
Furthermore, with Bill C-44, if the minister was satisfied that any non-citizen, who might be a 
UN Convention refugee, represent[ed] a danger to the public and [had] already been found by an 
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adjudicator to be a member of an inadmissible class for serious criminality, he or she [could] not 
appeal his or her removal from Canada to the Immigration Appeal Division.146          
 
3.3.1 Terrorists Slip Through the Security Screen  
 
The failure to adequately screen and deport dangerous refugee claimants left the entire 
refugee determination system vulnerable to criticism and provided a significant impetus for the 
enactment of greater security measures in the IRPA, especially after critics could point to 
empirical examples of refugee claimants with terrorist connections being able to slip through the 
Canadian security net by using the refugee system. Although Canada had in place mechanisms to 
screen and deport migrants with a criminal past or who committed crimes while their applications 
were being processed, it had not been entirely secure. The modern geo-political context, which 
has generated a phenomenal rise in transnational migration and refugee flows, had increased 
breaches in Canadas security screen. The result was that terrorists had become part of the 
transnational migration process and had found the means to enter Canada.  In 2001, the RCMP 
commented on how terrorists had been using the Canadian refugee determination system. A 
spokesman for the force described the situation as follows: 
[t]errorists entering Canada all have the same modus operandi: the first step is to 
claim refugee status, allowing the claimant to remain in Canada while their case 
works its way through Canadas often cumbersome immigration and refugee 
regulations. Next come applications for Canadian benefits-welfare and health 
cards granting access to medical care. That provides a base salary as they 
establish themselves. The terrorists then typically link with others in Canada who 
are engaged in crime to boost their income.147 
 
While explaining how the refugee system had been used by terrorists, the RCMP spokesman also 
made clear that only a fraction of refugee claimants had terrorist affiliations.  
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Nevertheless, it was clear that the refugee system had been vulnerable to penetration by 
terrorists.148 Canada, like other nations, had experienced terrorist attacks carried out by national 
insurgency movements linked to ethnic and national diasporas and state sponsored terrorists.  Reg 
Whitaker provides the following pre 9/11 survey of this phenomenon in Europe and Canada: 
Palestinian terrorism outside of the Middle East began in the 1960s and Islamic terrorism 
continues in the 1990s. Croatian and Armenian terrorism abroad predated the collapse of 
the Communist bloc. Kurdish terrorist acts have taken place in Europe, especially in 
Germany. Sikh terrorism has been linked to the destruction of the Air India flight 
originating from Canada in 1985, and Libyan terrorism to the bombing of a Pan American 
flight over Lockerbie Scotland in 1988. Recently, concern has been expressed in France 
that Algerian Islamic militants may be using that country as a base of activities against the 
Algerian government.149  
 
Similarly, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has reported that Canada has been 
used as base for support, recruitment, and fundraising for insurgency movements linked to 
national terrorist movements such as: the Real Irish Republican Army, militant Sikh 
organizations, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).150 Furthermore, by the 1990s, Canadas intelligence, police, and 
immigration services had warned, the government knew for years that worlds major terrorist 
groups had all established offshore bases in Canadian cities and that they were using Canada as a 
staging ground for political and religious violence around the world.151  
The LTTE provides an example of how criminal activities linked to refugee and émigré 
communities, in this case Sri Lankan Tamils who began arriving in Canada as refugees in the 
1980s, have been used to support homeland insurgency movements and terrorist acts overseas by 
fundraising for these activities in Canada.152 The LTTE was found by the Security Intelligence 
Review Committee (SIRC), a body of bi-partisan civilian appointees charged with reviewing the 
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activities of CSIS and the Security Certificate process in the Immigration Act, to be a terrorist 
organization responsible for assassinations, suicide bombings, ethnic cleansing, torture and rape.  
Furthermore, the 1999-2000 SIRC review named the Tamil Eelam Society in Canada as a front 
for the LTTE for which it had raised an estimated $2 million annually for the military purchasing 
arm of the Tamil Tigers since the mid 1990s.153 The RCMP has arrested fraudulent refugee 
claimants associated with the LTTE like Manickavasagam Suresh, a UN Convention refugee who 
was provided asylum by Canada but was subsequently ordered deported for lying about criminal 
convictions related to terrorism and for extorting money from new Tamil refugees in Canada. 
These funds were given to Eelam Society for LTTE military purchases.154 Consequently, by 
2001, CIC had ceased funding the Tamil Eelam Society, which had till then received government 
support to provide services to Sri Lankan refugees and immigrants.155 
 
3.3.2 Islamist Terrorists and Their Implication for Canadas Refugee           System, 
North American Security and Canada-US Relations 
 
Problematical procedural rules with the establishment of Canadas Inland refugee 
determination system which included a lack of administrative capacity to adequately screen and 
deport refugee claimants contributed to terrorists and other dangerous individuals being able to 
gain entry into Canada.  This significant security problem gained notoriety prior to the 
introduction of the IRPA in Canada and were also well-known to US lawmakers, especially when 
it became evident that Islamist terrorists had used Canadas inland refugee system to gain entry 
into North America where they had planned attacks on both countries.  Extremist Islamic 
fundamentalists had entered Canada posing as refugees and by July 2001, CSIS was advising 
that the threat of a terrorist attack involving Canadians had never been greater, and that radical 
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Islamic groups were a particular concerna warning issued barely two months before 9/11.156   
These groups and their individual members have been tied to global terrorist networks like al-
Qaeda, which began planning and perpetrating attacks on western targets in the 1990s. The 
admittance of refugee claimants belonging to these groups was singled out as one of the most 
glaring deficiencies in Canadas refugee determination system and has was a major irritant for 
Canada-U.S. relations. This was a major factor which provided the impetus for enacting enhanced 
security provisions in the IRPA.  
The American government and media had been critical of Canadas management of its 
high acceptance rate of inland refugees and its lack of due diligence in screening and monitoring 
refugee claimants.157 During the 1990s, Canadas inland refugee-determination rate was 61.8 
percent during a period when none of the other major destination countries, including the U.S., 
approached 50 percent.158 This fact, coupled with U.S. fears about the way Canada was handling 
the 25,000-40,000 people that claimed inland refugee status annually, led to American 
accusations that Canadas refugee policy was a magnet159 that was drawing a significant supply of 
illegal and possibly dangerous migration towards North America and ultimately towards the 
United States. American elected officials were expressing such concerns and criticisms even 
before 9/11.  
In 2000 Steven Lee wrote that, for the Americans the border is no less realtheir sense 
of other includes Canada as part of a vague, increasingly unfriendly, and potentially threatening 
world outside the U.S.160 This threatening worldview included Canadas immigration and border 
control policies, as was expressed in the United States House of Representatives in 2000. The 
Chair of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Lamar Smith (R. Texas), said in January that 
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year: Countering the threat of terrorism tops the agenda of the US Congress this week and our 
countrys porous border with Canada may be the place to start cleaning house. Americans want 
increased security in an increasingly unfriendly world.161 Such comments demonstrate that 
American interest in the Canadian border based on the perception that it was a potential threat to 
U.S security was evident even prior to September 11, 2001. 
American critics of Canadas inland refugee determination system could justify their 
criticism based on empirical evidence that was established before 9/11 between Canadas 
immigration and refugee determination system and at least one successful Islamist terrorist attack 
and two other foiled attacks in the United States. The first was the 1993 bombing of the World 
Trade Towers in which six people were killed. The lead organizer for that attack was Ramzi 
Yousef, an al-Qaeda member who used forged Canadian immigration papers to gain access to the 
United States.162 Yousef was one of 15,000 people who the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (INS) estimated attempted to illegally enter the United States from Canada annually in 
the 1990s.163 Illegal entry to the United States was also a factor in another intended terrorist attack 
on the U.S. that would have originated in Canada.  
This occurred in July 1997 when New York City police raided a Brooklyn apartment and 
caught two men, Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer and Lafi Khali, in the act of preparing explosive 
devices that they intended to detonate in the New York City subway system. As it turned out, 
both men were illegal aliens in the U.S., with Abu Mezer having come to the U.S. via Canada.164 
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Abu Mezers Canadian connection gained the notice of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee 
charged with investigating the attempted New York City bombing. Furthermore, one of the 
Committees key findings was that it was easy for criminal and terrorist elements to gain entry 
into Canada through its immigration and asylum systems and that they could remain in Canada 
for years without serious threat of removal.165                
The case of Ahmed Ressam has been the most celebrated example of alleged security 
failures in Canadas immigration and asylum system. In 1999, Ressam was caught carrying 
bomb-making ingredients at the border crossing in Port Angeles, Washington. He later confessed 
that he was a member of al-Qaeda and had planned an attack on the Los Angeles International 
Airport during the then up-coming millennium celebration. The Algerian born Ressam had 
entered Canada without documents of any kind and claimed refugee status. He did not appear at 
the hearing scheduled by the Canadian government to review his case and subsequently lived in 
Canada where he was arrested several times without being deported despite his flaunting of 
Canadas immigration laws. Ressams eventual apprehension at the Port Angeles border crossing 
was the result of a custom agents hunch during a routine car check.166  
In addition, Ressam and fellow Algerian refugee claimant Samir Ait Mohamed had 
planned attacks on Canada. At Ressams trial, it was revealed that Mohamed had entered Canada 
in 1997 with a false Belgian passport and a fake name. However, immediately after he arrived in 
Canada Mohamed claimed refugee status but was denied. He was allowed, however, to remain in 
Canada after his 1998 refugee hearing because the Federal Court reversed the refugee tribunals 
original negative ruling. Both Ressam and Mohamed confirmed during their trials that they had 
planned to blow up a gasoline truck at the busy Montreal intersection of Laurier and Park: an 
intersection situated in Outrement, a neighbourhood that houses Montreals Hasidic Jewish 
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community. The two men had also planned to bomb a busy commercial district of Montreal, 
along Ste. Catherine Street.167    
The above examples demonstrate that in order to protect its citizens from acts of violence 
such as the ones discussed above, Canada, like other host countries, has had to screen individuals 
carefully. Although the international principles on refugee determination require host countries to 
assume from the beginning of the determination process that refugees are fleeing genuine 
situations of risk and persecution, in todays geopolitical context a proper risk assessment of 
individual claimants is warranted. However, the factors that determine if a claimant poses a threat 
are not always clear. For example, claimants whose countries of origin are located in regions 
known to produce nationalist insurgency and terrorist movements may find that their refugee 
claims for protection are scrutinized much more extensively and rigorously. Decisions on 
screening are complicated because some politically active and militant groups can be 
multifaceted. Some of them have complex operational structures that serve legitimate political 
concerns and functions, but are also tarnished by the actions of cells which tend to employ 
terrorist tactics in pursuit of their objectives. Some examples of such organizations include the 
Kurdish Workers Party which claims to represent the interests of the Kurdish minority in Turkey, 
and Hezbollah and Hamas which claim to represent the political interests of Palestinians.  
In the absence of a fully functioning state devoted to providing them with education, 
health, and social services, a people involved in an independence struggle may turn to 
organizations that sometimes employ what are or may be depicted as terrorist methods.168 
Furthermore, Reg Whitaker claims that: 
Being involved with these groups may not have anything to do with terrorism; 
however, there is a tendency among security officials simply to categorize such 
groups as terrorist, especially those with leftist ideas, and thus anyone 
associated with them is, ipso facto, a terrorist.169          
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Another issue that makes it difficult to determine the validity of whether or not a refugee claimant 
represents a terrorist threat is the quality and interpretation of the information used in the 
determination process. In many instances intelligence derived from sources could be politically 
biased and perhaps violate the spirit of the UN Convention if it comes from intelligence services 
that serve states that have a poor human rights record or are a source of persecution against 
refugee claimants.170  
For example, it could be argued that if Canada relied solely on the Indian Security 
Service to assess the threat of either Sikh or Tamil Sri Lanken claimants, it could prejudice these 
claimants refugee determination hearings since the Indian government openly opposes the Sikh 
and Tamil independence causes. However, it is rather unlikely that Canada would rely 
exclusively on information provided under these circumstances unconditionally. The acceptance 
of Tamil refugees by Canada attests to this fact.171 This raises an important point about security 
screening, however. Despite the faith placed in it by politicians, security screening according to 
Whitaker, is not like medical screening for viruses. It reflects political biases, with a very uneven 
impact on different kinds of refugees.172          
Clearly both international and domestic politics influence the refugee/security nexus. 
Before Bill C-11 was introduced in 2001 and the 9/11 attacks in the United States, Washington 
had been critical of Canada for allowing refugee claimants to slip over the U.S. border. Untracked 
refugee claimants in Canada like Ahmed Ressam clearly demonstrated that they could pose a 
security threat to the United States and exposed flaws in the Canadian refugee system. But, 
according to Peter Rekai, Ressams story, raised a broader range of questions than the refugee 
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issue, including concerns about Canadas ability to keep track of people subject to enforcement, 
execute removal orders and appropriately secure its passport procedures.173   
 
3.4 Recommendations of The House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship 
and Immigration Report    
  
The sixth major factor which highlighted the need for influenced the design of security 
provisions in the IRPA was the Refugee Protection and Border Security: Striking a Balance 
Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration produced 
in the spring of 2000. That report, which was based on extensive consultation, demonstrated not 
only that security and refugee issues had intersected before 9/11, but also how the conjoined 
issues were perceived by lawmakers and the government. The report was tabled in the House of 
Commons before the official consultations on Bill C-11 had begun, but it had the specific 
mandate to examine the security and refugee issue and was the only parliamentary committee 
entrusted with this particular mandate before the passing of Bill C-11.  The intended purpose of 
the Report was to offer recommendations to the government before it introduced Bill C-31, the 
precursor to Bill C-11. Although the Committees report highlighted some of the shortcomings 
related to national security and the refugee determination system and called for reform, it also re-
stated Canadas obligation to protect refugees. The Report was released just one year before Bill 
C-11 was introduced. This factor makes it a valuable document from which to examine the 
security and protection reforms that parliamentarians had envisioned for implementation in the 
IRPA. 
To begin with, the introductory remarks of the Report acknowledged the dual purpose of 
protection that had been embodied in Canadian law and past policy. In relation to refugees, the 
Report reiterated Canadas commitment to protect them and recognized that caution and fairness 
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must be exercised when determining a refugee claim. On this matter, the all-party Committee 
stated: 
The Committee wishes at the outset to dispel any misconception that may have 
arisen because the committee was studying the refugee determination system and 
border control at the same time. Any inference that all individuals arriving as 
migrants and claiming refugee status should simply be labeled illegal is wholly 
unwarranted. Even if refugee claimants manner of arrival is irregular, we 
recognize that the flight to freedom is often fraught with peril, speed and the 
necessity to use whatever means are available to reach safety. Once here, 
claimants have certain legal rights, Canada has corresponding duties. Over the 
years, Canada has offered protection to many genuine refugees, and we feel 
strongly that Canada must continue to do so.174     
 
The Committees report made it clear that there were security implications and matters of 
illegality associated with some claimants who had sought refugee protection from Canada. But 
the Report also indicated the difficult task that the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), had 
had in its attempt to alleviate abuse and to ensure a procedurally fair adjudication process: 
it would be naïve to maintain that the refugee system is free from exploitation 
by those who make unfounded claims to refugee status as a way of staying in the 
country, or, more recently, by those who wish to buy time until they can enter the 
United States. The problemand the challengeis to distinguish swiftly 
between those with genuine claims and those who would take advantage of a 
refugee system that is generally acknowledged to be one of the best in the world. 
The truth is that it is often not easy to tell the two groups apart. Both often use 
fraudulent documents; both often employ smugglers to assist them; both may tell 
similar stories. Sorting the truth from false, as well as judging whether claims 
with some merit are sufficiently compelling to meet the stringent refugee 
definition in our law, which is virtually identical to that in the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees is the job of the Refugee Division of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB).175  
 
Therefore, a central focus of the Report was to examine the functions of the IRB in 
relation to its delegated national security task of determining the legality and possible criminal 
and terrorist affiliation of refugee claimants. The connection between refugee determination and 
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national security was linked by the committee report with the self-selected aspect of asylum-
seeking as a form of migration; unlike immigrants, UN Convention refugee claimants had come 
to Canada without having undergone criminal and security checks. Furthermore, the Report 
reiterated that the multi-tiered adjudication process for inland refugee claimants had been 
criticized for being typically a slow process and, as stated above, for at times having failed to 
keep track of refugee claimants.176 The Committee restated the fact that even though Canadian 
law permitted interim detention of refugee claimants who were considered a possible threat to the 
public or a flight risk a lack of intelligence to identify high-risk claimants and a lack of detention 
facilities have limited the number of detention orders.177 But the Report reminded readers that, 
even under the UN Refugee Convention, there were clauses that allowed for potential claimants to 
be assessed for any potential security risk that they might pose178 and those that posed a security 
risk were considered inadmissible under the UN  Convention.179  
The Report clarified that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had conducted security checks on behalf of the former 
Immigration Department, which became Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) in 1993. All 
immigrants and persons deemed UN Convention refugees by the IRB and who had wanted to 
apply for permanent residence status had had security checks done on them. However, the initial 
security check for inland refugee claimants had typically only involved the following procedures: 
upon arrival, they had been interviewed for a half hour; were fingerprinted; had their photographs 
taken, and finally were released with instructions to return for an admissibility hearing when 
contacted by CIC.180 In general, it had taken at least two years, sometimes longer with appeals, to 
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determine if a refugee applicant had required protection. If they acquired refugee status, they 
could almost immediately apply for permanent residence, and three years after that, Canadian 
Citizenship. Thus, in Canada, on a positive note, almost all refugee claimants had been given the 
chance to integrate into the community, especially since they had been immediately given the 
right to work and to receive social benefits without having to wait for a security clearance.181 But 
the consequence of this policy had been that refugees were only screened for security purposes 
once they applied for permanent resident status. Thus, before 2001, thousands of foreign nationals 
living in Canada had not been screened for the security threat they might have posed.182 In 
response to this security concern, the House of Commons Report recommended that security and 
criminal checks should be initiated as soon as a person made a claim for refugee status.183     
However, the Committee stated that all recommended reforms of the refugee 
determination system were to be in accordance with established Canadian laws and regulations, 
and international obligations; the Striking a Balance Report reaffirmed that Canada should 
support a refugee determination system whereby: 
Canadian law mandates a process for all individuals who arrive here and make a 
claim to protection on the basis that they fear persecution on specified grounds 
should they be returned to their country of origin. The law applies regardless of 
their manner of arrival, regardless of whether they have travel or identity 
documents, and regardless of their country of origin. Unless excluded from the 
process on criminal, security and certain other grounds, claimants are entitled to 
an oral hearing before two decision-makers of the Refugee Division of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board. A person who is found by the Board not to be a 
Convention refugee has a right to make an application for leave to apply for 
judicial review to the Federal Court  Trial Division. The leave provision is 
stringent, and few claimants are successful. A further appeal is available to the 
Federal Court of Appeal, but only if the lower court judge certifies that the case 
raises a serious question of general importance.184  
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 While the House Committee Report reaffirmed that the due process procedures which 
had become part of the refugee determination system should be upheld, it again reminded readers 
that security deficiencies had become a part of that same system.  Given that the Report was 
initiated in the immediate aftermath of the Ressam case and the arrival of boatloads of illegal 
economic Chinese migrants on Canadas West Coast just one year prior, it is not surprising that 
the House of Commons Report reiterated that there were justifiable reasons to detain refugee 
claimants. 185 One reason cited was if there was evidence of trafficking. Human traffickers extort 
large sums from their clients and they often, repay the traffickers through a lengthy period of 
virtual bondage in sweatshops, restaurants, or in prostitution.186  Furthermore, the detention of 
refugee claimants who are suspected of being involved with traffickers sends a message to the 
individuals who conduct this activity. According to the Report, detention removes the financial 
underpinnings of the traffickers enterprise and thwarts the economic goals of migrants.187   
In the Chinese boatload case, given the fact that these migrants came to Canada with the 
help of an international organized crime syndicate that specialized in people smuggling, the 
Committees Report recommended that future refugee claimants in similar situations be detained 
as flight risks until their claims could be verified. The Report also stated that refugee claimants 
who refused to co-operate in establishing their identities should be detained owing to the fact that 
on average 8 percent of annual refugee claimants were either undocumented or uncooperative or 
both. Uncooperative in this case meant that,  in addition to arriving without any travel or 
identity documents, the individuals refuse to answer the most routine questions asked of them by 
immigration officials upon arrival.188 The Committee acknowledged that some of these 
individuals might be too traumatized in certain instances to cooperate fully with authorities. For 
example, women fleeing situations of domestic abuse or sexual assault may feel uncomfortable 
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being questioned by a male immigration officer. Furthermore, an engendered fear of government 
officials on the part of some claimants might also lead to uncooperative behaviour. However, the 
Report stated that even severely traumatized individuals should be able to respond to basic 
questions about their identities. Furthermore, the Committee stated that to allow people about 
which nothing is known to remain at large pending hearing of their refugee claims, strains public 
confidence and credulity.189 However, the Committee was adamant that detained refugees should 
not be treated as common criminals and, therefore, if claimants were to be detained, they should 
be housed in separate and adequate correctional facilities.190       
Furthermore, the Report recommended changes to the way refugee claims were 
considered and conducted. The first change recommended by the Committee was for a one-
member IRB panel to replace the two-member panel; this change was envisioned as a way to 
expedite the hearing process. It was hoped that this would allow the IRB to hear more claims, and 
by doing so, help to avert any future backlogs in the refugee determination system.191 Also, 
following a negative hearing at the Refugee Division, the Committee recommended that failed 
claimants at this stage should be removable from Canada. Problems had occurred at this stage in 
the system according to the Report because the whereabouts of most failed claimants were 
unknown. Furthermore, the majority of claimants often failed to report to immigration officials.192 
Therefore, the House Committee recommended that the government tighten the procedures that 
follow after a claim is rejected in order to ensure that the person involved is actually removed 
from Canada. In order to accomplish this, the Committee suggested that refugee claimants should 
show up in person to receive their final decision on their cases, at which time if a deportation 
order had been issued it could be carried out.193          
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The Report also recommended that a formalized pre-removal risk review procedure for 
failed and repeat claimants be included in the new legislation as a way to expedite and 
consolidate the appeal process. This procedure had helped to determine if any new evidence 
regarding the claim or a change of circumstances in the persons country of origin warranted 
changing a negative decision to a positive one. If there had been no change since the time of a 
persons initial claim, then the person was to be removed from the country after the pre-removal 
review.194 The Committee held firm to the idea that the pre-removal risk assessment was 
procedurally fair even though as an administrative practice it would deny repeat and failed 
claimants access to another full refugee hearing. An argument against the use of streamlined 
appeal processes, such as the pre-removal risk assessment, has been that the system in general is 
defective in catching mistakes; therefore, allowing repeat claims is essential to guarding against 
deficiencies in the hearing process. Moreover, refugee advocates having strongly criticized the 
lack of such a mechanism and the necessity of taking refused cases to the Federal Court, with 
leave.195 The Committee held that this would be a compelling argument if there were no 
provisions in future legislation for a new appeal mechanism that would ostensibly catch any 
deficient application of the determination process. Furthermore, the Committee recommended 
that a summary procedure mechanism for dealing with repeat claims should be established 
through any pre-removal risk assessment process.   
In the end, this appeal process was envisioned by the Committee as a reasonable method 
to conserve resources by avoiding appeals to the Federal Court and by discouraging a revolving 
door strategy employed by some claimants. Therefore, a new Refugee Appeal Division, as well as 
a pre-risk removal process, was called for in the report; these two procedures were to function in 
tandem as the internal appeal structure within the IRB. Moreover, the Committee saw these two 
procedures as a safety-net for refused claimants; they would expeditiously examine cases where 
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clear errors had occurred while helping to ensure that consistent decision making was adhered to 
at the IRB. By strengthening the internal appeal mechanisms within the IRB, the Committee 
hoped that this would end the automatic appeal by failed claimants to the Courts. Appeals to the 
Federal Court by failed refugee claimants have been associated with helping to build the refugee 
backlog and also had been blamed for allowing criminals and suspected terrorists the opportunity 
to avoid being removed from Canada.196                  
The Standing Committee Report also suggested streamlining the refugee determination 
system process by improving travel document security, and creating a new offence in the 
Immigration Act to charge individuals who help others fraudulently gain entry into Canada.197 
The Committee recommended that the required period between repeat refugee claims be 
increased to one year from 90 days to serve as a disincentive for fraudulent refugee claimants, 
and that, upon arrival, claimants only would have 30 days to request a formal refugee hearing.198 
Related to these and the other recommendations in the Committee Report, a general theme 
emerged for the government to use more of the legal and regulatory tools at its disposal in order 
to ensure that the refugee system was better managed.199 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
  
Canada, like other industrialized countries, was forced in the 1980s and 1990s to deal 
with the controversy over the appropriate response to an unprecedented increase in refugee 
claims: special attention was dedicated to inland refugee claims which, although greater in 
number during this period, still only represented a small percentage of total immigrants.200 Over 
the last twenty years, refugee numbers in Canada have ranged from 17,000 to 44,000 a year, 
whereas total immigrant numbers have ranged from 150,000 to 240,000. Nonetheless, the 
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increase in refugee claimants has forced receiving-countries such as Canada to examine their, 
moral and legal responsibilities to victims of persecution, oppression, and deprivation elsewhere 
in the world.201  
Two important factors have been at work within this issue: first, most countries have 
maintained at a formal level that there is no right of immigration as an element of their 
sovereignty; and second, refugees have claimed special legal obligations upon a host country 
different from ordinary immigrants. Moreover, because many refugee claimants have been self-
selected, they have in a sense undermined the ability of receiving states to regulate and control 
the nature of their immigration intake. From the 1980s until the present, Canada has imposed new 
bureaucratic measures to handle and screen a growing number of refugee claimants. These 
measures were enacted in order to ensure the validity of refugee claims, to stem the inflow of 
claims, to provide legal protection for claimants so they received a fair and balanced review of 
their applications, and to ensure that claimants did not pose a security risk. However, on the latter 
point, it has been documented that the admittance and non-removal of dangerous individuals, 
including terrorists, has threatened Canadas national security.    
Moreover, the Striking a Balance Report confirmed that the idea of protection in 
Canadian immigration law does not solely apply to protecting the rights of refugees. Along with 
highlighting the dual nature of protection in Canadian immigration laws, the House of Commons 
Report discussed numerous reasons why refugee related issues have produced security concerns 
amongst policy-makers and the general public.  
The Committee Report exhibited the same tension that relates back to the debate over the 
rights of citizens versus the claims of refugees; the claims of asylum seekers often run counter to 
the claims of a host countrys own citizens. One reason for this is that the majority of citizens in a 
host-country believe that, refugee recognition, with its consequent privileges, is a 
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discretionary act of a sovereign state.202  On the opposite side of this issue, refugee advocates 
condemn this approach and seek to have the rights of asylum seekers treated on par with those of 
citizens.203   
However, the rights of citizens versus the rights of non-citizens and vice versa has been 
established under both international and national law, and been contested through legal processes 
in Canada. Moreover, judicial decisions have had major, precedent-setting implications for how a 
host-country must meet its international legal obligations and program-management functions 
related to refugees and immigrants.204 Host countries like Canada have, therefore, attempted to 
balance the rights of citizens and asylum-seekers by establishing a legal and procedural 
framework. The Striking a Balance Report restated this conceptual understanding of the dual 
nature of protection in Canadian immigration law, especially as it pertains to refugees. 
Furthermore, it reconfirmed Canadas commitment to find a balance between these two 
principles, but also highlighted security deficiencies in the refugee determination system that 
could threaten Canadian national security.  
Moreover, the House of Commons Report revealed that a debate was occurring in Canada 
over whether the possible threat posed by refugees should tilt the balance between human rights 
and national and public security in favour of the latter. The House of Commons Committee dealt 
with this issue and chose to highlight recommendations inspired by both camps. The Striking a 
Balance Report focused on a need to tighten the refugee security screening, determination, and 
appeal processes, but also reminded the public of Canadas obligation to provide a just refugee 
determination system which adheres to its international obligations outlined in the UN 
Convention on Refugees. Thus, an all party House of Commons Committee presented many of the 
refugee security issues that had come to the fore of public debate in Canada before the IRPA. It 
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was then left to the Liberal government of the day to decide which of these recommendations it 
should enact when it tabled its new immigration legislation in the House of Commons in 
February 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: 
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Comparative Overview of Canadas Refugee System Under  
the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the 1976 Immigration Act  
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
The second guiding research question of this thesis is the following: Did amendments in 
the IRPA constitute a fundamental change to Canadas refugee determination system? The intent 
of this chapter is to present a comparative overview of Canadas refugee system under the IRPA 
and the 1976 Immigration Act in order to examine important administrative and procedural 
changes that arguably had consequences for the rights and procedural rules associated with the 
refugee hearing process in Canada under the IRPA. For example, the new legislation constituted 
provisions for one- member IRB panels; previously, two-member panels were the norm, and both 
members of the panel would have had to agree for a claim to be rejected.  Bill C-11 also made it 
permissible for the Minister to intervene in any hearing before the IRB.205  Also noteworthy in 
Bill C-11 was a provision that stated all IRB decisions had to be accompanied by a reason placed 
on the official record either in written or oral form. In particular, the Refugee Protection Division 
was required to provide written reasons for its decisions. This measure was likely established in 
order to aid refugee claimants if they went before one the IRBs appeal bodies.206   Many of the 
changes to procedural rights for refugee claimants and enhanced security provisions were related 
to changes in the mandate and composition of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) and its 
divisions.    
 
 4.1 The Structure of the Immigration and Refugee Board  
 
Under the new Act, the refugee determination system is still co-administered by the IRB 
and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration with most of the procedural issues associated 
with refugee rights still located within the IRB.  By the time Bill C-11 was introduced, the IRB 
had evolved into Canadas largest administrative tribunal, employing close to 200 board members 
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who were independent in their decision-making.207 Bill C-11 maintains the previous 
administrative structure of the IRB; at the head of the organization is a Chairperson appointed by 
the Governor in Council who also appoints members of every IRB division except the 
Immigration Division (ID). Members of the Immigration Division remain public servants 
appointed under the Public Service Employment Act.208 Most importantly, refugee hearings at the 
IRB remained non-adversarial under the IRPA.209 
The IRB was re-configured with four divisions: the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), 
formerly the Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD), which decides on claims 
made for refugee protection within Canada; the Immigration Division (ID), formerly the 
Adjudication Division, which conducts hearings for certain categories of people believed to be 
inadmissible to, or removable from, Canada, as well as review for those being detained in 
Canada; the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD), which continues under the same name and 
hears appeals from the Immigration Division as well as appeals of refused sponsorship 
applications, appeals from certain removal orders, and appeals by permanent residents outside 
Canada; and the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) which will hear appeals from the Refugee 
Protection Division, though this division is still yet to be implemented.210   
 
 4.2 Procedures for Checking the Security and Identity of Asylum Seekers 
  
In general under the IRPA, on arrival, an asylum seeker will be screened by an officer of 
the Citizen and Immigration Canada department. The claimant is obliged to complete a 
questionnaire relating to issues such as their identity, travel documents, education, employment 
history, date of birth, family members, marital status, criminal record, route to Canada, and 
previous refugee claims. After reviewing the completed questionnaire, the immigration officer 
                                                        
207 Gallagher, Canadas Dysfunctional Refugee Policy: Canadian Policy from a Comparative Perspective, 
21. 
208 Dolin and Young, Canadas Refugee Protection System, 4. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid., 4. 
 72
determines whether or not the claimant is eligible to have the claim heard by the Refugee 
Protection Division, which will grant or deny refugee status. New in the IRPA is the requirement 
that the screening process must be completed within 3 days of the asylum seekers arrival. If the 
initial claim is not completed within the 3 days as specified in the IRPA, it is deemed to have been 
referred to the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) where a decision is made on whether or not the 
claimant can gain refugee status.211 This means that claimants will not be waiting indefinitely for 
their claim to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division. Although not designated by statute, 
the government stated that with the enactment of the IRPA it expected through regulations to 
begin security screening at the commencement of a refugee claim. Before the IRPA security 
checks were initiated only when the claimant applied for permanent residence.212 Grounds of 
ineligibility include:213 
! prior asylum claim in Canada; 
! coming from a prescribed safe (third) country 
! prior recognition as a refugee in another country to which the person can be returned; 
! being inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, 
serious criminality or organized criminality. 
 
If the immigration officer is of the opinion that a refugee claimant is inadmissible, he or she will 
prepare a report and transmit it to the Minister. If the Minister considers the report to be well 
founded an admissibility hearing will be held before the Immigration Division of the IRB.214 
 As for inadmissibility based on safe-third country provisions, since 1989 when this 
ground was incorporated into the Immigration Act, the Governor in Council has had to prescribe a 
list of countries that would meet the definition of a safe third country. Such a list was not 
established until after the IRPA became law and the Safe Third Country agreement with the 
United Sates was negotiated in 2002. The IRPA lists the factors that the Governor in Council has 
to consider when entering into a safe third country agreement. These include: 
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(a) whether the country is a party to the Refugee Convention and to the Convention 
Against Torture; (b) its policies and practices with respect to claims under the Refugee 
Convention and with respect to obligations under the Convention Against Torture; (c) its 
human rights record; and (d) whether it is party to an agreement with the Government of 
Canada for the purpose of sharing responsibility with respect to claims for refugee 
protection.215  
 
 4.3 Grounds for Inadmissibility   
  
Under Bill C-11 the Adjudication Division was replaced by the Immigration Division 
(ID) which maintains the functions of conducting admissibility hearings at ports of entry and at 
inland CIC offices at the request of the Minister for certain categories of people he/she believes 
are inadmissible to or removable from Canada. The ID will also oversee detention reviews for 
most persons being detained under the IRPA. Also, if at any time after an initial review, an 
immigration officer determines that an asylum seeker is a security threat, violator of human rights 
or has a record of serious criminality, then he/she can be deemed to be ineligible to be referred to 
the Refugee Protection Division.216  
When a refugee claimant is found to be removable from Canada, their refugee claim is 
suspended, and an admissibility report is referred to the ID.217 Since 2003, the Canadian Border 
Services Agency (CBSA) has been in charge of initiating the inadmissibility and detention 
processes. First, it provides the Immigration Division with a report containing reasons for why it 
believes that a refugee claimant or individual with permanent resident or refugee status should not 
be admitted or allowed to stay in Canada. Then, a single member of the Immigration Division 
presides over an inadmissibility hearing, which is an adversarial process, unlike the formal 
refugee hearing.  Hearing participants include a hearing officer who represents the Minister, and 
the person concerned, who has the right to be represented by counsel. Both parties can present 
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evidence and call witnesses. At the end of the hearing, the ID adjudicator will either authorize the 
person concerned to enter or remain in Canada, or will order the person to leave the country.  
The IRPA maintains a situation whereby the determination of admissibility is an on-
going process. If at a later date, claimants who have been referred to the IRB for a refugee 
hearing are found to be ineligible to make a claim for protection, their hearing or other 
proceedings will be halted, and their cases will be transferred to the Immigration Division. 
Inadmissibility can result from past, present, and future events, and will also cover omissions. 
The Immigration Division has the authority under the new Act to "claw back" proceedings at any 
time during the claims process if it discovers that a claimant meets any of the above 
inadmissibility criteria.  According to IRB chairperson, Peter Showler: 
In other words, they can provide the board with notice that the person is of 
concern to them and could potentially be before an admissibility hearing. If they 
have significant concerns about security issues, they would then refer it to an 
adjudicator to determine whether the person is actually admissible to Canada.218 
 
Moreover, if the ID orders claimants removed on serious criminal and security grounds, they are 
denied access to the Refugee Appeal Division, and any decisions made by the IRB about their 
case are nullified.219 In this situation, the provisional removal order issued for all new claimants 
upon arrival will be carried out by CIC. As well, in these cases all refugee and permanent 
residency applications will be suspended until inadmissibility hearings before the Immigration 
Division and court decisions are concluded.220 
 Section 100(2) of the IRPA ensures that suspected terrorists, members of groups 
engaging in organized crime, war criminals, security risks, or senior members of governments 
that have seriously violated human rights will also have their IRB proceedings suspended if 
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negative information comes to light following their referral.   If the information is confirmed, the 
refugee claim does not proceed.  
However, a person ordered removed may still apply under the IRPA to the Federal Court 
of Canada Trial Division for leave for judicial review of any IRB decision. Permanent residents 
and refugee claimants issued a removal order for non-serious criminal offences may also appeal 
to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) of the IRB.221 However, under Bill C-11 there will no 
longer be an automatic stay of removal if a refused or removable claimant files for judicial review 
of a negative decision before the IRB. Claimants found inadmissible, therefore, can be removed 
before their judicial appeals are completed.222  
Under the old Immigration Act, rejected claimants at the initial entry interview, or at any 
other time during the determination process were allowed to apply for membership in the post-
claims refugee determination in Canada class (PCRDCC),223or they could leave the country for 
sixty days and then try again to have their claim heard before the CRDD.224 This allowed them to 
reapply for a hearing by the IRB after sixty days.  However, when Immigration Officers screen 
claimants for ineligibility under the IRPA they exclude from referral to the IRB those under a 
removal order and those claimants who have already received refugee protection in Canada, or in 
another country to which they can be returned. Failed claimants and individuals who withdrew or 
abandoned their refugee claims are disallowed under the IRPA from making another claim before 
the IRB, and can only make an application to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for a pre-
removal risk assessment (PRRA) after being out of Canada for six months.225    
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In the new Act, a person inadmissible for human rights violations, security issues, and 
serious criminal activity or organized crime, will no longer be allowed to apply for refugee status. 
Previously, for a claimant to be ineligible on security grounds or human rights violations, the 
Minister had to be of the opinion that it would be contrary to the public interest to have the claim 
determined.226 Instead under the IRPA, they will be referred directly to a pre-removal process. 
They will have a determination, but it will be within the context of removal. They do not have 
access to the refugee system.227 That is a significant change which demonstrates that the IRPA 
was designed to stop persons who constituted criminal and terrorist threats from entering the 
refugee determination system. If they were identified later as threats they could be denied access 
to the refugee system by conducting an on-going review of their eligibility throughout the IRB 
determination process.  
These provisions meant that asylum seekers could be denied access to Canada, and in 
certain cases this could mean the principle of non-refoulement could potentially be ignored. 
Canada is a signatory of the 1987 Convention Against Torture, article 3 of which prohibits 
refoulement. However, sections E and F of Article 1 of the UN Refugee Convention allow Canada 
to exclude those not believed to need protection or who are deemed to be a threat to the public.228 
The exclusion grounds in the UN Refugee Convention included in the previous Act are also found 
in s.98 of the IRPA.  As demonstrated by the preceding provisions, grounds for inadmissibility 
under the IRPA, as under the former Act, establish situations where the procedural rights of 
refugees are considered as being secondary to public safety and security measures.  
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Figure 4.3 Admissibility Hearing Process229 
 
 
 
 4.3.1 Inadmissibility on Grounds of Serious Criminality  
 Grounds for defining organized criminality were amended as part of the inadmissibility 
category in the IRPA.  Serious criminality is defined as either: (a) a crime that carries a maximum 
term of imprisonment of ten years and for which the person received a term of imprisonment for 
at least two years; or (b) a conviction outside Canada, that if committed in Canada would carry a 
maximum punishment of ten years or more, and the Minister is of the opinion that the person 
would be a danger to the public.230  Previously, as Dolin and Young explain: the danger opinion 
also applied to convictions in Canada; now, a prison sentence of two years or more serves as a 
proxy for serious criminality in the Canadian context.231  
In the old Act, the definition of serious criminality had no reference to a prison sentence 
and the person had to be declared by the Minister a danger to the public in order to be ineligible 
to make a refugee claim or be deported. However, the requirement of a Ministers danger 
opinion for ineligibility grounds based on serious crimes committed abroad remains in the new 
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Act and benefits refugees and permanent residents.232 This provision is intended to prevent a 
situation whereby a refugee claimant is denied access to the IRB because of a conviction in their 
country of origin that could have been based on politically trumped up charges, or where the 
quality of evidence used to prosecute them was inadequate by Canadian standards.233 
Maintaining the ministerial danger opinion requirement for serious crime committed 
abroad protected against wrongful deportation of foreign and permanent residents. Historically, 
the designation of a danger opinion required the minister to label refugee claimants, foreign 
nationals, and permanent residents a danger to the public before removal procedures could 
proceed against them, even though from the governments point of view this was seen as a very 
time-consuming administrative process that allowed convicted criminals to remain in the country, 
namely because danger opinions were often challenged in the courts. This, therefore, delayed 
the deportation of certain individuals deemed to be security and criminal risks.234   
However, Bill C-11s new definition of serious criminality committed in Canada is an 
instrument to speed up the removal of foreign nationals and permanent residents convicted of 
serious crimes. From the standpoint of protecting refugee rights, however, eliminating the 
requirement for a ministerial danger opinion for serious crimes committed in Canada is a 
backward step. Mandatory application of the danger opinion for crimes committed in Canada 
forced the Minister to consider the extenuating circumstances of the accused. Factors that were 
considered include: the actual sentence imposed by the court where the accused was convicted, 
the age of the offender, whether the conviction was a first offence, and, chance of 
rehabilitation.235 Therefore, critics argued that the rights of refugees and permanent residents were 
limited by this serious criminality provision in Bill C-11; this provision permitted Immigration 
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Division adjudicators to ignore the extenuating circumstances of those convicted of a serious 
crime.236   
Furthermore, Bill C-11 also denied those convicted of a serious crime an appeal of their removal 
or deportation orders before the IAD, the IRBs main appeal body.237 Balanced against this 
argument, however, is the fact that both the former Immigration Act and IRPA contained a 
rehabilitation exception clause.238 This exception applies to individuals who satisfy the minister 
that they have rehabilitated themselves, and at least five years have elapsed since the expiration of 
any sentence imposed for the offence or since the commission of the act or omission to divulge 
the act had occurred.239   
 
 4.3.2 Inadmissibility Based on Security Grounds  
  According to subsection 34(1) of the IRPA, a permanent resident or a foreign national is 
inadmissible on security grounds for:  
(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic 
government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;(b) engaging in or 
instigating the subversion by force of any government;(c) engaging in terrorism;(d) being a 
danger to the security of Canada;(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might 
endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or(f) being a member of an organization 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts 
referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).240 
As was the case in the previous Act, the Minister can admit such persons if their presence 
would not be considered detrimental to the national interest.  
Importantly though, the terms terrorism and member of an organization remain 
undefined in the IRPA, just as they were in the former Act. Therefore, the inherently political 
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process of defining terrorism remains open to interpretation under the IRPA to definitions 
provided either by the Minister or other government agencies that handle security matters. But 
the lack of a definition also guard against too wide a net being cast around those under 
investigation for terrorism or those suspected of being a member of an organization that 
engages in terrorist activities because a judicial interpretation has usually been required in 
cases where terrorist charges have been laid.  The definition of terrorism in Canadian 
immigration law, therefore, remained undefined until after the IRPA became law. 
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the broad definition of terrorism contained in the 
IRPA in the 2002 case Suresh v. Canada. The Court defined terrorism for the purpose of 
immigration law as the following:  
an act intended to cause death or serious injury to a civilian, or to any person 
not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when 
the purpose of such act by its nature or context is to intimidate a population or to 
compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing 
any act.241  
 
Suresh dealt with a deportation order against an individual who argued that he would face torture 
if returned to his home country since Suresh was alleged to be a member and fundraiser for the 
Tamil Tigers. He made his case based on the fact that Canada had ratified the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT), which explicitly prohibited state parties from returning people to torture. Article 
3(1) states: No Party shall expel, return, (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subject to 
torture.242 This is supposed to be an inviolable provision for signatories of the CAT.  Article 2(2) 
of the CAT reads: No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or threat of 
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war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification 
of torture.243  
Directly contradicting this provision in the CAT is section 115(a)(b) of the IRPA that 
permits deportation to a country where the persons life would be threatened if the person is 
inadmissible for any specified reason and has been designated to be a danger to the security of 
Canada.244 This Canadian law provides that under certain circumstances, people may be deported 
to face torture.  However, the Court allowed Sureshs appeal and ordered that he was entitled to a 
new deportation hearing based on the likelihood that he would be tortured if returned to his 
country of origin. But in making this decision the Court also upheld the legislation as valid, albeit 
with a restricted interpretation of when a deportation can take place. The Court stated: 
We do not exclude the possibility that in exceptional circumstances, deportation to face 
torture might be justified, either as a consequence of the balancing process mandated by s.7 
of the Charter or under s.1Insofar as Canada is unable to deport a person where there are 
substantial grounds to believe that he or she would be tortured on return, this is not because 
Article 3 of the CAT directly constrains the actions of the Canadian government but 
because the fundamental justice balance under s.7 of the Charter generally precludes 
deportation to torture on a case-by-case basis.245    
 
The effect of the Suresh Decision was such that, according to Dolin and Young: In cases where 
there is evidence of a substantial risk of torture should the person be removed, the Suresh 
decision of the Supreme Court suggests that the Minister will be required to grant a stay of 
removal in almost all circumstances.246  However, if a refugee claimant were to meet the 
inadmissibility criteria based on security and criminality grounds, the Minister or the Immigration 
Division had the prerogative to place a detention order against them.    
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4.4 Detention of Refugee Claimants 
Under the new legislation foreign nationals, other than a person with protected status247 or a 
permanent resident may be arrested and detained without warrant.248 Detention may be continued 
if the Immigration Division is satisfied that:  
! they are a danger to the public;  
! they are unlikely to appear for further proceedings;  
! the Minister is taking steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that they are 
inadmissible on grounds of security;  
! or the Minister is of the opinion that identity has not been established and is making 
reasonable efforts to do so.249  
 
Bill C-11 changes the policy of detention established by the previous Act ― foreign nationals, 
including refugee claimants (but not individuals granted protected status) can be detained without 
a warrant based on the aforementioned grounds at anytime. The power to arrest and to detain for 
identity purposes was a power previously limited only to persons seeking entry to Canada. 
However, Bill C-11 requires that an arrest warrant is issued in all circumstances for the detention 
and arrest of individuals with permanent resident and protection status. 
The IRPA stipulates that the Immigration Division has to be notified immediately by CIC 
or CBSA when a foreign national has been detained at their initial port of entry interview. A 
review of the detainees circumstances is required to occur within 48 hours and then again within 
seven days and every thirty days thereafter.250 Furthermore, the Immigration Division is required 
to review the reasons for detention at least once during the first seven day detention period and 
during each subsequent thirty day detention period.251 Under the previous Act, the review cycle of 
48 hours, 7days, and 30 days thereafter was only prescribed with respect to persons who were 
detained as flight risks or for security reasons.252 In general, under both acts, the major grounds 
for detention remain the same. They are if a person poses a danger to the public, is considered 
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unlikely to appear at procedures under the Act, or he/she needs to be picked up in the opinion of 
the Minister or an officer in order to establish their identity.253  
New in the IRPA was a reference to cooperation in s.58 (1)(d) of the Act which 
provides grounds for detention if the Minister is of the opinion that the detained person has not 
reasonably cooperated by providing relevant information for establishing his/her identity.254 
However s. 58 of the IRPA is balanced with s. 106 in the new Act which codifies the Immigration 
Divisions responsibility to consider a claimants reasonable explanation for his/her lack of 
documentation or his/her failure to reasonably secure it during the refugee determination 
process.255 This measure ensures that immigration officers take into account cultural differences 
when considering the use of detention. This provision also demonstrates sensitivity to the fact that 
in many countries, government officials are viewed with trepidation, and also that language and 
other barriers need to form part of the overall assessment to ensure that the detention provisions 
are applied in a non-discriminatory manner.256 Therefore, for asylum claimants failure to produce 
documents will not automatically lead to detention.  However, if a claimant does not cooperate 
with authorities, this fact will be recorded and considered during any future detention review and 
during the hearing process for refugee and protection eligibility.257 
 In addition, permanent residents and persons already granted protected status can be 
detained upon entry if an officer considers it necessary to do so in order for the examination to be 
completed or has reasonable grounds to suspect that they are inadmissible on grounds of security 
or for violating human or international rights.258 The Immigration Division is required to order the 
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release of permanent residents or foreign nationals unless it is satisfied, taking into account other 
factors, that:  
! they are a danger to the public; they are unlikely to appear for examination, an 
admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the 
making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection 44(2); 
! the Minister is taking necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that they are 
inadmissible on grounds of security or for violating human or international rights;  
! the Minister is of the opinion that the identity of the foreign national has not been, but 
may be, established and they have not reasonably cooperated with the Minister by 
providing relevant information for the purpose of establishing (sic) their identity; 
! or the Minister is making reasonable efforts to establish (sic) their identity.259 
 
These measures put a lot of pressure on unidentified individuals to cooperate by providing 
relevant information to officials.  
In the four years preceding the IRPA, about eight thousand people were detained on 
average per year for an average of sixteen days in Canada.260  Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada and the Immigration Division consider specific factors before ordering detention, and 
during detention reviews. According to CIC:   
[the] decision-maker will consider whether the foreign national: is involved with, 
or is under the influence of criminally organized smuggling or trafficking 
operations; is a fugitive from justice in another jurisdiction; has convictions in 
Canada or abroad or outstanding charges for serious offences; is affiliated with 
organized crime; length of time spent in detention; alternative detention.261 
 
Section 44 of the IRPA allows officers of both CIC and the ID to impose other conditions than 
detention that they deem are necessary or reasonable. These conditions could include alternatives 
to detention such as the payment of a cash deposit or the posting of a guarantee to ensure 
compliance with other conditions.262  The person concerned or Citizenship and Immigration 
(CIC) may ask the Federal Court of Canada for leave to apply for judicial review of any decision 
rendered at a detention review hearing. 
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Figure 4.4 Detention Review Process263 
 
 
 4.4.1 The Security Certificate Process  
The most infamous use of detention in Canadian immigration law is the security 
certificate process. Canadian law permits the detention and deportation without any criminal 
conviction in Canada of non-Canadian citizens based on certain grounds prescribed in the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA: Sections 77-85), including security, war crimes 
and organised crime. The ability to detain or deport non-Canadians under a certificate process 
was first introduced in 1978 as part of Canadian immigration law. Under the IRPA, the Minister 
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
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can sign certificates in respect to protected persons and other non-Canadians who pose a security 
threat. The certificate process is only issued when there is sensitive information, usually provided 
by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), which needs to be protected for reasons of 
national security or the safety of any person. Intelligence information must be both reliable and 
supported by sufficient open-source information.264 
According to CSIS, the certificate process has been necessary when the subjects involved 
are suspected of posing a danger to national security and detention is necessary to halt their 
activities. The following situations have been cited by the government as appropriate reasons to 
detain permanent residents and foreign nationals with certificates: There may not be enough 
evidence for criminal charges, they may not have committed a criminal act, or their removal will 
disrupt the network and plans of terrorist organizations.265  Moreover, Campbell Clark states that 
security officials, privately argue that security certificates allow them to neutralize terrorists 
before they commit crime in Canada, when they do not have evidence against them.266   
Section 77 of the IRPA outlines how the security certificate process will be administered. 
This provision holds that: 
The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration may sign a Security Certificate alleging a non-
citizen to be inadmissible to Canada on grounds of security or serious 
criminality; the non-citizen is automatically detained without a warrant 
(detention of permanent residents require a warrant) simply on the basis of 
reasonable grounds to believe the subject is a danger to national security or the 
safety of any person, or is unlikely to appear for removal. A review of both the 
Security Certificate and the grounds for continued detention is required by the 
Federal Court, but the Court may hear the government's evidence in the absence 
of both the subject of the Certificate and his or her counsel. There is no 
requirement that the Government even inform the detainee of the precise nature 
of the allegations. Normal rules of evidence are dispensed with, including the 
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right to cross-examine witnesses and to challenge evidence obtained through 
normally unacceptable means such as hearsay, plea-bargains or even torture.267 
 
Furthermore, when a security certificate is issued all other immigration proceedings related to the 
subject of the certificate are suspended, except for the possibility of a ministerial review of an 
application for a pre-removal risk assessment by the permanent resident or foreign national, until 
the Federal Court makes a decision on the reasonableness of the certificate.  
Permanent residents or foreign nationals must be provided with a summary of the 
evidence so that they are reasonably informed of the reason on which the decision to issue a 
certificate was based.  However, the Department of Justice has stated before a House of 
Commons Committee that the summary of evidence excludes:  
information that would disclose the sources of information, particularly when the safety 
of the source would be at risk; information that would reveal investigative techniques; and 
information that was provided in confidence by foreign governments.268 
 
The judge may also consider information excluded from the summary in coming to a decision on 
the reasonableness of the certificate if determined to be relevant.269 The judge may also receive 
into evidence anything that, in the opinion of the judge, is appropriate, even if it is inadmissible 
in a court of law, and may base the decision on that evidence.270 
New in the IRPA is a provision whereby permanent residents would undergo the same 
review process as foreign nationals. This ended an automatic review of the circumstances of a 
permanent residents certificate by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), which 
reviewed the intelligence information used in the security certificate and reported its findings to 
the Governor in Council who would direct the Minister to authorize the certificate, if it was in 
agreement with the grounds for issuing it.  This step has been eliminated under the IRPA. 
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However, permanent residents can still request a SIRC review of the background security check 
that was used to justify the issuance of their certificate.271  But an automatic review by SIRC of a 
permanent residents security background was not an effective appeal mechanism in any case 
because the government has never been compelled by law to adhere to the recommendations of a 
SIRC review.272  For permanent residents, an initial review of detention must take place within 48 
hours, then subsequently every six months. Foreign nationals, including those with protected 
status, are not automatically conferred a set time in which their detentions would be reviewed.273  
After the hearing, if the judge has determined that the certificate is not reasonable then it 
and the security assessment of the Minister will be quashed. However, if the certificate is found 
reasonable, usually a removal order will be automatically put into effect for the subject of the 
certificate. Furthermore, no appeals are allowed for this type of Federal Court decision.274 If the 
certificate is deemed reasonable then it serves as conclusive proof under the law that the subject 
of a certificate is inadmissible. Furthermore, section 81 of the new Act stipulates that if a 
certificate is upheld, the recipient of the certificate is barred from making another application for 
protection; he/she is, however, allowed to apply for a pre-removal risk assessment during his/her 
certificate proceedings. And there is an automatic review of a claimants case after a certificate is 
upheld. A federal immigration officer will assess whether the certificate holder faces a significant 
risk of torture if returned to his/her country of origin or country of habitual residence. 
Furthermore, under section 84 of IRPA, once the reasonableness of a certificate is upheld by the 
Federal Court the foreign national or permanent resident is entitled to apply for a detention 
review if he or she has not been removed from Canada within 120 days. A judge may order 
release on conditions if satisfied that the person will not pose a danger to the national security of 
Canada if released. 
                                                        
271 Sinha and Young, 26. 
272 Aiken, 65. 
273 Peter J. Carver, Shelter From the Storm: A Comment on Suresh V. Canada (the Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), Alberta Law Review, vol. 40, (2002-2003), 468.  
274 Ibid., 469. 
 89
  
 4.5 The Refugee and Protection Determination Process  
Part 2 of the IRPA, Clauses 95-98 cover the definition of a United Nations Convention 
refugee and person in need of protection, while Clauses 99-111 set out the rules for 
conducting a refugee hearing. Once a person is found eligible to make a refugee claim, a 
conditional removal order is placed on the claimant. The case is referred to the Refugee 
Protection Division (RPD), and if the asylum seeker is determined to be a refugee, then the 
conditional removal order is not brought into effect. If the refugee claim is rejected or declared 
abandoned, then the removal order becomes effective, and the extradition provisions of the IRPA 
are brought into effect.275 Upon being referred to the Refugee Protection Division by the 
immigration officer, the asylum seeker has 28 days to submit a Personal Information Form (PIF) 
which makes up the main part of the application to the RPD. After lodging the PIF and the 
medical exams have been passed, the refugee claimant can apply for a work permit. If a refugee 
claimant does not file the PIF, the Board can declare the case abandoned which leads to the 
removal of the refugee claimant. 
Under Bill C-11, the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) replaces the Convention 
Refugee Determination Division as the administrative body of the IRB that decides on claims 
deemed by CIC to be eligible for a protection hearing. Now under Bill C-11, even if CIC has not 
completed a full eligibility determination, a claim will be forwarded to the RPD within three 
days. The Refugee Protection Division will assess claimants information and then hold hearings 
to decide their cases. Section 104 of the IRPA provides authority for CIC to re-determine 
eligibility at any time after a claim has been referred to the RPD, in which case the RPD loses 
jurisdiction to determine the claim. This combination of measures gives the RPD jurisdiction to 
start the asylum status determination process quickly after claims are presented. This overcomes 
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problems that formerly occurred when referral of claims to the CRDD was delayed, sometimes 
for months.276  
At the same time, claims that are subsequently discovered to be ineligible based on the 
inadmissibility criteria set forth in the IRPA can be pulled from the refugee determination 
process.277 The provisions of Part 1 in the IRPA cover the procedures related to detention, the 
criteria and definitions of inadmissibility (security, serious criminality, etc.) and the certificate 
process.  A claim will be suspended or terminated for the following reasons:  
a claim could be stopped in the Refugee Protection Division or the Refugee Appeal 
Division for any reason relating to ineligibility if:  a report had been made to the 
Immigration Division regarding ineligibility on grounds of security, serious criminality, 
etc.; or the person had been charged with a serious crime.  Material misrepresentation or 
withholding information relevant to eligibility would also stop a claim in the Refugee 
Protection Division.  Generally, where the claim was found to be ineligible, the 
proceedings would be terminated.278  
 Furthermore, section 106 of the IRPA requires the Refugee Protection Division to take 
into account with respect to the credibility of a claimant whether he/she possesses acceptable 
documentation to establish his/her identity, and if not, whether he/she has provided a reasonable 
explanation for the lack of documentation.    
While refugees and asylum-seekers may be unable to obtain valid documents because of a 
well-founded fear of persecution by the issuing authorities in their country of origin, the 
intention of this provision would be to provide measures to deter the deliberate and 
unfounded destruction of documents and the problematic practice of trying to conceal a 
true identity.279   
The above facts will be taken into consideration when the RPD assesses a claimants credibility 
to make a claim for protection.   
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Under Bill C-11, the IRB is required to provide notice of a hearing to the Minister, who 
can participate fully in the claimants hearing. However, if the Minister or his/her representatives 
give notice to the RPD that they do not wish to intervene in the case, the RPD will commence an 
expedited process. Then, if a Refugee Protection Officer (RPO) of the RPD is satisfied that the 
claimants identity has been established and the facts related to the country where persecution is 
claimed to have occurred are well founded, refugee status will be conferred on the claimant and 
no further hearings are required.280 If a person is found by the RPD to be a UN Convention 
refugee or in need of protection, his/her claim is considered successful and he/she can in most 
cases apply for permanent residency status within six months. Thus, the conferment of refugee 
status to a claimant by the RPD is the beginning of a process that can lead to him/her also 
receiving Canadian citizenship. This process, however, is contingent upon claimants proving that 
they qualify to receive Canadas protection.  
If the Minister or the RPO concludes that the claim is not manifestly well-founded, then 
there is a full hearing. Most hearings are conducted by a single member of the RPD. The hearings 
are non-adversarial and although usually held in private, are open to the public, unless the 
Minister makes an application for non-disclosure of the proceedings based on prescribed 
confidentiality criteria.281  The Minister also has a right, with notice to the claimant, to intervene 
in the proceeding. Both the Minister and the claimant are entitled to representation, and legal aid 
is available in most provinces to claimants.282 A representative of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has the right to attend any hearing and to participate 
through written submissions.283   The RPD is not bound by any legal or technical rules of 
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evidence and may base a decision on evidence that is considered credible or trustworthy in the 
circumstances.284 
 The previous Immigration Act contained only provisions relating to claims for UN 
Convention status but other grounds for protection had been incorporated into the Act through 
regulations, administrative practices of CIC, and the requirements established through case law. 
The definition of Convention refugee under the IRPA did not change: 
(96)A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or 
political opinion, 
(a)is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, 
unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or 
(b)not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual 
residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.285 
In the previous Act, only Convention refugees were recognized but the new Act reflects Canadas 
obligation under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and the requirements of a number of important decisions by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in regards to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
Canadian refugee and protection law.286 Therefore, the IRPA includes as a prescribed class a 
person in need of protection which describes someone who has received refugee protection, and 
whose claim or application had not subsequently been rejected or vacated.287 
 The definition of a protected person is very similar to the definition used in the 
previous Act for a member of the post-determination refugee claimants in Canada Class 
(PDRCCC).288 This class allowed refugee claimants who were not recognized by the IRB as UN 
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Convention refugees to apply to CIC for consideration on general grounds relating to risk.289  The 
IRPA consolidates these protection decisions within the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of 
the IRB by including the protected persons and expands the definition of risk to include those 
for whom there were substantial grounds to believe would face the danger of torture should they 
be returned to their country of origin.290 Under the IRPA, those who receive status before the IRB 
are called protected persons because they are either a Convention refugee or a person in 
need of protection.291  
  Adding the term a person in need of protection to the Convention refugee definition in 
the new Act still implies that people seeking application for refugee or protected status face a 
substantial risk to life or torture if they were returned to their country of origin.292 And as with the 
previous Act, according to Sinha and Young, the grounds for protection under the IRPA remain 
stringent in that: 
risk would have to be personal to that individual (in the sense that others in the 
country would not generally face the same risk), and would have to be faced in 
every part of the country. It would not be tied to the imposition of lawful 
sanctions unless those were beyond what were accepted internationally 
(persecution not prosecution), and could not be related to the inability of the 
country of origin to provide adequate health or medical care.293  
 
Nonetheless, the title of the new Act indicates that the government was establishing a more 
expansive interpretation of who would qualify for asylum; for the first time the words 
protection,  immigration, and refugees appeared side by side in the title of Canadas 
immigration law. In addition, Bill C-11 clearly demarcated two separate Parts for immigrants and 
refugees in the new Act: Part 1 was entitled Immigration to Canada and Part 2 Refugee 
Protection. It was not clear, however, at the time, how consolidated grounds for protection would 
affect the actual refugee determination process.  
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Bill C-11 contained streamlined procedures designed to expedite the refugee hearing 
process. The most significant change to the hearing process is the replacement of two-member 
panels with one member. Under the former two-person format a split decision generally led to a 
ruling in favour of the claimant. Theoretically, the two-person panel represented a more 
favourable mechanism for granting refugee protection. The change to one-member panels is 
particularly important when a claim is rejected. Both the old and new statutes stipulate that in 
cases where a claim is rejected decision-makers should consider any credible information on 
which a favourable decision could have been based. If no credible basis is found, then the 
claimant would be considered ineligible to receive an automatic stay of removal and 
administratively this could make him/her a priority for removal. If, however, the decision- maker 
states that the claim does in fact contain credible and trustworthy evidence, then a stay on the 
removal order is granted, so that the claimant can apply for an appeal. 
Whereas under the old statute the credibility test was determined by a two-member panel, 
and both members had to agree that this situation was applicable to the claimant, under Bill C-11 
the IRB Chairperson reserves the right to convene three-member panels in the event of complex 
hearings.  Furthermore, the argument that two member panels afforded more procedural leeway 
to claimants can be contested. Historically, only 1 percent of cases before the IRB were split-
decisions; this means, therefore, that members of CRDD and now the RPD have demonstrated a 
fairly consistent approach to decision-making.294 
In addition the IRPA contains clauses that disallow a claim where the factors surrounding 
it have ceased to require that a claimant seek asylum. Cessation clauses were in the previous Act 
but, in order to invoke them, the Minister had to bring an application to the Convention Refugee 
Determination Division (CRDD). Under the IRPA, the RPD is automatically required to reject a 
claim under cessation criteria that are virtually the same as in the previous Act.295 Under s.108 (1) 
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of the IRPA, a claim for refugee protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a Convention 
refugee or a person in need of protection, in any of the following circumstances:  
 (a) the person has voluntarily reavailed themself of the protection of their country of 
nationality;(b) the person has voluntarily reacquired their nationality;(c) the person has 
acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of that new 
nationality;(d) the person has voluntarily become re-established in the country that the 
person left or remained outside of and in respect of which the person claimed refugee 
protection in Canada; or (e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection 
have ceased to exist.296 
In general, the concept of cessation relates to a situation where the RPD would have found a 
person to be a refugee had there not been a change in their status. If the application was 
successful, the persons claim for protection would no longer be recognized. As Dolin and Young 
explain: 
This criterion would in practice be applied only where the reasons for the need for 
protection ceased to exist close in time to the grant of protection (since most successful 
claimants will be granted permanent resident status within 6-12 months of the RPD 
decision).  There is an exception to this criterion for people who establish compelling 
reasons arising out of previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment for refusing to 
return home.  This exception recognizes that some experiences are so horrific that forcing 
someone to return to the country would be cruel.297    
 
 4.6 Right of Appeal Under the IRPA 
People who are not permitted to have their claims to protection heard by the IRB are 
issued conditional removal orders.  According to Dolin and Young: 
These orders come into effect when the claim is abandoned or withdrawn, or when it is 
finally refused and all further steps have been exhausted; for example, when an application 
for leave to apply for judicial review is denied or an application for a pre-removal risk 
assessment is unsuccessful.  Those claimants who are found ineligible for referral to the 
Board and issued removal orders may apply to the Federal Court  Trial Division for leave 
to apply for judicial review of both the removal order and the decision of the immigration 
officer regarding eligibility.298   
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Usually parties are not allowed to appear at applications for leave to apply for judicial review 
and applications are decided by a single judge. Appeals are not permitted on a decision on a 
leave application. Successful applicants in their leave applications are entitled to a hearing 
before the Trial Division of the Federal Court.  Trial Division decisions can be appealed to the 
Federal Court of Appeal if the Trial Court Judge finds in their decision that a serious question 
of general importance is involved and the Judge sets out the question.299 
4.6.1 The Immigration Appeal Division   
 
The IRPA, like the previous Act, upholds the right of certain groups to have full appeal 
rights to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) against a decision or a removal order, while for 
others these rights are restricted or eliminated. People who have been protected as refugees would 
be able to appeal a removal order. The Minister can also appeal any decision of an inadmissibility 
hearing to the IAD. People can appeal a removal order if they believe that the officer or the 
Immigration Division made a legal error, or they believe they should not be removed from 
Canada on humanitarian or compassionate grounds. Members of the IAD hear appeals and 
Hearings officers represent the Minister at appeal hearings. Like the RPD hearing, rules of 
evidence are more flexible than a formal court of law and the IAD can consider any evidence it 
believes credible and trustworthy.300    The IAD can take one of three actions following an appeal 
hearing: 
! Dismiss the appeal: The appeal is rejected and the removal order is confirmed. 
! Allow the appeal: The appeal is successful and the removal order is cancelled. 
! Stay the appeal: The IAD can stay (postpone) the removal order for a certain period of 
time.301  
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Bill C-11 eliminates the right of appeal to the IAD for individuals, including serious 
criminals (those given at least a two year sentence), members of organized crime and those who 
pose a security risk. This is a significant point of departure from the previous Act that allowed 
full appeal rights for these individuals unless they had been issued a security certificate.302 
Furthermore, under the old Act permanent residents who were found inadmissible because of 
serious criminality were only denied access to the IAD if the Minister had filed a danger opinion. 
According to Sinha and Young:  
The administrative process for reaching that decision [began] in local offices, and 
the decision [was] made centrally in Ottawa. It [involved] weighing a number of 
factors concerning the crime, the circumstances, and the offence. That process 
would be replaced by the objective fact that a person had been sentenced to 
prison for two years or more.303        
 
The establishment of some standardized criteria for serious criminality and the end of the 
ministerial danger opinion requirement affected appeal rights in much the same way as they 
affected inadmissibility criteria.   However, according to CIC, this measure: 
streamlines the removal of permanent residents who receive sentences of at least two 
years and eliminates the possibility of their deportation order being set aside by the IAD on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds after the government decides that the 
circumstances of the case warrant the deportation of the person at the end of the sentence. 
However, permanent residents receiving sentences of less than two years of imprisonment 
retain the right to appeal their removal order to IAD on issues of law as well as 
humanitarian and compassionate considerations.304 
 
Another important change under the IRPA is that a protected person who is under a 
stayed removal order by the IAD for reasons of criminality who is then convicted of a serious 
criminal offence, (section 36(1) of IRPA: a potential sentence of at least 10 years or an actual 
sentence of over six months) will have their stay of removal cancelled by operation of law, and 
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their appeal will be terminated.305 However, new in the IRPA, when the Minister files an appeal 
with the IAD, as the appellant, to challenge favourable decisions of members of the Immigration 
Division involving persons protected as refugees, according Sinha and Young:  
The Division could make and stay the applicable removal order or dismiss the appeal, even 
if satisfied the decision appealed was wrong in law or fact, or a principle of natural justice 
had not been observed.306  
All decisions made at the IAD are subject to judicial review by the Federal Court. Both 
the Minister and the claimant may file for a judicial review of an IAD decision. Bill C-11 
provides a stay of removal for 15 days following a negative refugee determination or appeal at the 
IAD so persons under a removal order can file their leave or stay applications to the Federal 
Court. Under the former Immigration Act, unsuccessful refugee claimants who were facing 
removal had two additional avenues of appeal beyond judicial review. They could apply to be 
recognized as a member of the Post Determination Refugee Claims in Canada Class (PDRCC),307 
and they could submit a humanitarian and compassionate appeal (H&C).308  These two processes 
are considered under the IRPA as part of the new pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA). 
 4.6.2 The Pre-Removal Risk Assessment 
            The pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) is available to persons who have been ordered 
removed, found inadmissible to make a claim before the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), or 
denied refugee status by the RPD. The PRRA is intended to check if these individuals face 
persecution or other forms of risk if they were to be returned to their country of origin. In essence 
it is a final appeal mechanism that could allow them to remain in the country. Under the IRPA, 
those found ineligible at the initial review stage or at a later point during the determination 
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process and who are subsequently ordered removed, can apply for a pre-removal risk assessment 
(PRRA).309  
The risk-related criteria under which a claimant could be granted protection under the 
PDRCC process or under an H&C appeal have been incorporated into the definition of "a person 
in need of protection" in section 97(1) of IRPA. As a result of these changes, the grounds on 
which the RPD can grant protection to refugee claimants have been widened. But, at the same 
time, the post-determination recourse available to failed refugee claimants has been narrowed 
considerably. Under the new legislation, failed refugee claimants may apply for a pre-removal 
risk assessment (PRRA), which is carried out shortly before the planned removal of the individual 
to another country. An appeal to the Minister on humanitarian and compassionate grounds is also 
still available, but this is limited to issues relating to the applicant's situation in Canada and has 
nothing to do with possible risks the person may face if removed to another country.  
The PRRA fulfilled Canadas commitment to ensure the principle of non-refoulement. 
The former Immigration Act had prescribed in regulations that unsuccessful refugee claimants 
would be allowed to stay in Canada if they were determined to be at risk of death or serious harm 
in the country to which they were to be removed. There was no requirement that the harm feared 
be related to any specific ground, as is a requirement for refugee status. However, the risk of 
harm had to apply to the individual personally, not merely as a member of a class of persons 
subject to a common risk. Bill C-11 codified this administrative process that had evolved as an 
administrative review of risk prior to removal in the old Act, particularly in cases in which a 
significant period of time had elapsed between the original protection determination and 
removal.310 The IRPA provides that people seeking protection in Canada who are eligible for a 
PRRA will be notified by CIC that they have 15 days to submit a written application for 
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protection. This letter would be sent after claimants received a removal order. Moreover, if the 
PRRA application was submitted on time, it conferred an automatic stay of removal until a final 
decision on the application was made. Under the IRPA specific PRRA officers of the Immigration 
Division (ID) are designated to decide whether a rejected claimant qualified as a Convention 
refugee or a person in need of protection. The IRPA stipulates that almost anyone who is Canada 
and subject to a removal can apply for a PRRA.311 
However, Bill C-11 denies the pre-removal risk assessment to individuals found 
inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality 
and organized criminality, persons whose claims had been rejected on the exclusion grounds 
stated in section F of the 1951 Convention,312 and persons named in a security certificate.313 
Individuals found inadmissible on these grounds will only be allowed to have their claims of risk 
assessed and judged by the Minister through the Immigration Division. The major factor 
considered for these individuals is the extent to which they represent a danger to the security of 
Canada and the nature and severity of the acts they have committed. A negative decision by the 
Minister or the Ministers delegate will result in the applicants removal from Canada. In cases 
where the risk of return is considered overriding, risk protection will be granted, but only in the 
form of a stay of removal, and they will not be granted the chance to apply for permanent 
residence status.  Furthermore, if at a later time the claimants country of origin situation changes, 
they could be removed.314  
The pre-removal risk assessment is also denied to the following individuals: those being 
extradited; those who have already been recognized as Convention refugees in a country to which 
they could be returned; and those who have been rejected for refugee protection in Canada and 
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have returned less than six months after their claim was refused, withdrawn, or abandoned.315 The 
fact that repeat claimants are denied access to the IRB and have waited six months to seek 
another PRRA instead of 90 days as in the previous Act, has led to criticism that the PRRA is 
being used as a pre-screening mechanism for frequent claimants.  Refugee advocates claim that 
this screening method denies people access to the full refugee determination process.316 
Furthermore, critics argue that this provision fails to consider that even if claimants return before 
six months, this does not necessarily preclude them from meeting the definition of a UN 
Convention refugee or person in need of protection. Bill C-11 does not address how or if 
protection will be determined for rejected claimants who returned less than six months after their 
claims were rejected.317  
Presumably, the governments rationale for denying rejected claimants access to the IRB 
and making them wait six months before they can reapply for Canadas protection through a 
PRRA was to provide a disincentive for bogus refugee claims and to stop what the government 
called the revolving door.318 The PRRA, therefore, was a mechanism that streamlined the 
process of evaluating repeat refugee claims. This administrative tool is related to the Ministers 
mandated prerogative, in both the former and new Acts, to address security considerations along 
with ensuring the integrity of processes conducted under the Act. According to departmental 
literature, a PRRA conducted by CIC allows the Minister to take into account individual risk and 
public safety concerns. A PRRA by CIC also allows for protection decisions to be rendered in a 
timely manner in conjunction with removal priorities.319 Ostensibly, by only allowing a PRRA to 
repeat claimants the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) would be freeing 
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its own and the IRBs resources while still providing a procedurally fair determination of risk to 
individuals who had previously been assessed.        
PRRA officers will use Bill C-11s consolidated protection grounds of risk of persecution 
as defined in the UN Convention, danger of torture and, risk to life and cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment as defined under the CAT.320 Thus, the PRRA and the Refugee 
Protection Division (RPD) will use the same definition of risk, but the PRRA will only base its 
decisions on evidence received after the initial protection claim was refused, such as evidence 
that demonstrated a change in the conditions of a claimants country of origin.321 The PRRA 
allows applicants to submit information that they could not reasonably have presented at their 
initial refugee hearing. Consideration of risk is provided to almost all refugee claimants through 
the PRRA, but it is to be done in an expedited manner and by independent decision-makers 
within the CIC.   
If protection is granted to individuals at the PRRA stage, they are allowed to apply for 
permanent residence status. If refused, they could still make an application to the Minister to 
remain in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. This application, however, does 
not act as a stay of removal.322 The only exception for removal after a failed PRRA is if a 
claimant received successful leave to appeal to the Federal Court. 
 
4.6.3 The Refugee Appeal Division  
According to Sinha and Young, [s]ince the design of the refugee status determination 
system in the mid-1980s, refugee advocates have been extremely critical of its lack of an appeal 
mechanism.323 This concern on the part of advocates is addressed in part in Bill C-11 by the 
introduction of a new division in the IRB, the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), whose mandate is 
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to determine appeals from refused claimants and the minister over decisions made at the Refugee 
Protection Division. The grounds for appeal to the new division are quite wide: based on law and 
fact, or both mixed law and fact.324 This appeal process does not, however, consist of a hearing 
where claimants present the merits of their cases; instead it is based on the record of proceedings 
and submissions before the Refugee Protection Division. Thus, appeals to the RAD will be in 
writing only, and will be reviewed by decision-makers experienced in refugee matters. RAD 
adjudicators will have the power to either affirm RPD decisions or overturn them and substitute 
their own decision.  
Federal Court judges can only adjudicate in matters of law or fact when they review 
refugee and immigrant cases. Furthermore, only about 10 percent of annual applications are 
accepted for review by the Federal Court.325 Thus, the vast majority of refused claimants have 
been denied an appeal on the merits of their case. The RAD was promoted as a way to provide 
claimants more opportunity to appeal their cases, and also speed up the time in which it took to 
have cases settled by setting up an administrative appeal body that by-passed the courts.   In 
addition, the Minister has the right to appeal to the RAD whenever he/she is not satisfied with a 
positive decision made by the RPD. For example, the Minister might decide to appeal a RPD 
decision if an application to vacate a refugee claim before the RPD is ignored by that division. In 
such a circumstance the Refugee Appeal Division would have the power to:  
[C]onfirm the original decision; substitute its own opinion (except if it believed a 
hearing was required or the appeal had been brought by the Minister and was 
based on the claimants credibility); or refer the matter back to the Refugee 
Protection Division for a re-determination, together with any directions it 
considered appropriate.326         
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Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Elinor Caplan, testified during Senate hearings 
on Bill C-11 that, from the governments standpoint, the RAD would create faster procedures and 
more consistent decisions about refused claims which in turn would establish an enhanced body 
of jurisprudence for the Federal Court to follow.  
To this end, submissions before the RAD can be made by the Minister, the person whose 
claim is at issue, a representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), and any other officer or member of the IRB.327 The RAD is to be staffed by 
experienced refugee decision-makers, and make decisions in a quorum. The RAD, therefore, 
provides access to an appeal for any decision made by the Refugee Protection Division. Minister 
Caplan described the RAD as being part of an overall government agenda to streamline the 
refugee determination system. The first step would see an individual referred for a single member 
hearing before the RPD. Then, if he/she were refused, his/her case would be referred for a paper 
review before the RAD to ensure fairness and consistency in decision-making and that IRB 
protocols were adhered to during the course of the decision. It was expected by the Minister that 
judicial review would be the last step. The RAD, therefore, is seen as way to deal with mistakes 
made before the Board, and this, in turn, would provide greater assurance to the Federal Court 
when it had to decide on leave applications. As a result of this process, the Minister envisioned 
that fewer cases would be reviewed at the Federal Court, and this in turn would help to prevent a 
backlog.328         
Furthermore, the Refugee Appeal Division may have been included in Bill C-11 in order 
to appease critics who claimed that the IRPAs streamlined determination and appeal procedures 
might reduce the ability of refugee claimants to receive Canadas protection. According to Dolin 
and Young: 
                                                        
327 Sinha and Young, 33. 
328 Testimony by Elinor Caplan, P.C., M.P., Parliament, Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, 
Science, and Technology, Issue 29-Evidence, (Ottawa, Thursday, October 4, 2001), available at: www . 
parl.gc.ca /37/1/parlbus /commbus/senate/com-e/soci-e/26ev-e.htm? Languages =E&Par l= 37 &Ses = 
1&comm_id=47, n.pag. 
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When concerns were expressed about the reduction of the size of the panel 
hearing protection claims from two members to one, the Department often 
pointed to the RAD as a quality control mechanism. As things currently stand, 
claimants are able to be heard only by single-member panels and must obtain 
leave from the Federal Court for a appeal of that individual members decision. 
The RAD was supposed to be a trade-off, according to some refugee 
organizations, that would allow Members of Parliament and the advocacy groups 
to swallow the harsher sections of the new law.329        
 
Peter Fowler, Chairman of the IRB, appeared to confirm this argument when he stated during 
Senate hearings on Bill C-11 that, I would not be comfortable saying to you that a system of 
single member decision-makers without the RAD would be a better system.330  However, as 
previously mentioned, the RAD was not established after the IRPA was enacted.   
 
4.7 Conclusion  
The IRPA contains very stringent provisions concerning people suspected of being a 
danger to public safety, not respecting the law or abusing the Canadian system. For example, the 
IRPA expands the provisions concerning detention without warrant and extends the power to 
arrest and detain persons who cannot establish their identity (s. 55). Refugee claimants without 
proof of identity can be detained if they refused to co-operate with measures to establish their 
identity. The IRPA also expands inadmissibility categories on the basis of security (s. 34), human 
or international rights violations (s. 35), serious criminality (s. 36), organized criminality (s. 37), 
(s. 39), misrepresentation (s. 40), and non-compliance with the Act (s. 41). In addition, the Act 
does not define terrorism, although it is a grounds for inadmissibility under IRPA.  
The IRPA also restricts the right of immigration appeal, removing all right of appeal and 
power to review removal orders against any person, even a permanent resident, who is 
                                                        
329 Dolin and Young, Canada Refugee Protection System, 16-17. 
330 Testimony by Peter Showler, Parliament, Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science, and 
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inadmissible on the grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious 
criminality and organized criminality (s. 64). The Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science 
and Technology, which tabled its final report on Bill C-11 on October 23, 2001, heard many 
witnesses who expressed concern about clause 64, which would remove the right of a permanent 
resident or protected person convicted of a serious crime from appealing his or her deportation 
before the Immigration Appeal Division.331  Other witnesses criticized Bill C-11 for barring 
individuals, including permanent residents, found inadmissible on the grounds of security, 
violating human rights, serious criminality or organized crime, access to the IRB if they were 
found inadmissible during the course of their refugee application. Other witnesses expressed 
concerns about the Refugee Protection Division and the Refugee Appeal Division being able to 
suspend their consideration of a claim at any stage on these same grounds (s. 103). The IRPA was 
also heavily criticized for not allowing unsuccessful refugee claimants access to a second claim 
before the IRB, and for instead only allowing them a pre-removal risk assessment after they had 
been out of the country for six months.332 As for multiple claims, IRPA extends the waiting 
period before a new claim can be submitted from 90 days to six months to discourage what the 
government calls the revolving door.333  
Other witnesses commented positively about provisions in Bill C-11. Testimony during 
the hearings praised the titles in Parts 1 and Parts 2 of the IRPA which give separate status to 
immigrants and refugees.  Other witnesses praised the government for including the reference to 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  Still other witnesses claimed that Bill C-11s expanded 
definition of protection gave the IRB additional jurisdiction to extend asylum not only to 
Convention refugees but also to other persons in need of protection. Other witnesses claimed that 
refugee protection would be enhanced by a merits-based appeal of negative refugee 
                                                        
331 The report is available on the website of the Standing Senate Committee on the Social Affairs, Science 
and Technology: http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus 
332 Sinha and Young., 46-47. 
333 Ibid. 
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determinations through the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD).  The RAD will give failed refugee 
claimants the right to a paper appeal of an IRB decision, which will help reduce discrepancies in 
numerous decisions. This new appeal body within the IRB was also seen as a way to ensure 
procedural fairness as now most refugee claim hearings under the IRPA will take place before a 
one-member rather than two-member panel (s. 163). From a humanitarian perspective, Bill C-11 
managed to maintain a determination system for asylum-seekers that upheld Canadas 
international obligations and was premised on a fair tribunal process, which included a new 
mechanism to address errors made during this process with the new Refugee Appeal Division.334   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
334 Ibid., 48-49. 
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Chapter 5:  
Assessment of IRPA and Recommendations for Reform 
 
5.0 Introduction  
 
 The central objective of this thesis has been to examine the relationship between the 
federal governments international obligation to protect refugees, and its responsibility to protect 
both the national security and the public safety of its citizens and permanent residents. In order to 
meet the above objective this thesis posed three major research questions: What provided the 
impetus for extra legal and security provisions in the IRPA related to refugees? Did amendments 
in the IRPA constitute a fundamental change to Canadas refugee determination system? Did the 
IRPA strike a right balance between safeguarding the rights of refugees and safeguarding national 
security? These questions represent key elements of the refugee/security nexus, a problem that the 
IRPA is designed to partly address.  The objective in this chapter is to provide a summary and 
analysis of the answers to each of those questions.  
 
5.1 Findings Regarding the Impetus for Extra Legal and Security Provisions in the 
      IRPA Related to Refugees  
 
 Since the 1976 Immigration Act, Canada has had a formalized refugee determination 
system recognized by statute which fully accedes to the UN Refugee Convention. Almost from 
the implementation of the old Act, there was an unprecedented increase in the number of asylum-
seekers who sought Canadas protection. This created huge backlogs in the determination system 
and a crisis of legitimacy became associated with the refugee system as a result of the backlog 
and examples of what were seen as disingenuous or bogus refugee claims. This period also 
witnessed national security becoming conflated with the backlog and lack of enforcement of 
exclusion criteria under the law. This formed the basis of what has been described as the 
Refugee/Security Nexus: the numerical threat of a growing number of fraudulent refugee claims 
combined with criminals and terrorists who entered and remained in the country as a result of the 
backlog. A few high profile examples point to the existence of this phenomenon, e.g. Ahmed 
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Ressam in 1999.  The Refugee/ Security Nexus also had an impact on Canada-U.S. relations: 
the United States perceived a lack of diligence on the part of Canada in monitoring its refugee 
system for criminals and terrorists. Again, very few, but high profile, examples appeared to 
confirm some of the concerns expressed by American authorities.  
 Therefore, throughout the 1980s and 1990s there were calls for better administrative 
efficiency and management of the refugee determination system by enforcing stricter exclusion 
provisions for those seeking Canadas protection and who were deemed a threat to public safety.  
But during this same period, calls for more restrictions were balanced with the imperatives of 
Canadian jurisprudence which after the 1985 Singh Decision required that access to the 
determination system for person physically present in Canada be limited as little as possible, that 
an oral hearing be provided to claimants, and review of their cases be conducted by an 
independent body. In 1989, Bill C-55 created the independent Immigration and Refugee Board 
(IRB), a quasi-judicial tribunal which presided over a multi-tiered refugee determination process 
and provided unprecedented procedural rights to refugee claimants. 
 Prior to the IRPA, the Immigration Act and its amendments established circumstances 
that made a refugee claim ineligible; this meant that the claim could not be heard before the 
Convention Refugee Determination Division of the IRB. The purpose of this exclusion order was 
to facilitate as quickly as possible the removal from Canada of an individual not deemed eligible 
to receive Canadas protection. The inadmissibility clause applied to those considered dangerous 
criminals, persons who had already been granted refugee status in another country, terrorists and 
war criminals, and those who had been denied refugee status in Canada within a period of 90 
days.  Problems related to enforcing these provisions of the Immigration Act as they relate to 
refugees were the subject of the 2000 Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration 
Report, Refugee Protection and Border Security: Striking a Balance which advocated for a 
tightening up of the screening, detention, and removal procedures in the Canadian refugee 
system. The Report highlighted the problem of the refugee security nexus but advocated for an 
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open refugee system with tightened security provisions.335 The Reports findings elaborated upon 
the dual nature of the meaning of protection in Canadian law and influenced the federal 
governments agenda for a newly revised Immigration Act.  
 
5.2 Findings Regarding Whether Amendments to the IRPA Constitute a  Fundamental 
      Change to Canadas Refugee Determination System 
    
The IRPA includes justifiably tougher legal measures, not radically different from the 
amended 1976 Immigration Act, against claimants who commit serious crimes, are considered 
security threats, or who are found not to be genuine refugees.  However, the IRPA does not alter 
the fact that most refugee claimants in Canada will continue to have their cases heard before the 
quasi-judicial and independent IRB. Furthermore, Bill C-11 does not alter IRB proceedings from 
what, according to the Auditor General, have become institutionalized so that asylum-seekers are 
given the benefit of the doubt.336 It is difficult to argue that the IRBs institutional mandate to 
provide procedurally fair refugee determination procedures that meet Canadas international 
obligations, has been significantly altered through new security measures and streamlined 
determination and appeal procedures. Importantly, two central facets of the IRBs mandate 
remained in place: the IRB maintained its ability to make decisions independent from the 
                                                        
335 The Report emphasized the need to streamline the system and reduce the length of time it took to 
process claims while still welcoming those that required our help. The need to detain people whose 
identities were suspect and refused to cooperate in establishing their identities was also a priority. Other 
changes recommended included the following: one-member IRB panels to hear refugee claims; that refugee 
claimants appear in person to receive the final decision on their case and if denied, they should be removed 
if a deportation order has been ordered against them; and a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) for failed 
and repeat claimants in order to expedite the claims and appeal processes. However, in tandem with the 
PRRA, the report also called for an internal appeal body within the IRB which would provide a paper 
review of the claimants case and thus ensure consistent and procedurally fair decision-making before the 
IRB. See Chapter 3, Section  3.4  Recommendations of the House of  Commons Standing Committee on 
Citizenship and Immigration of this thesis, p. 63-70.  
336 The Auditor General stated in his report on the processing of claims that, non-adversarial hearings take 
place in a context where the very nature of the claim poses major challenges of availability and quality 
information, and, while in theory the burden of proof is on the claimant, Canada has decided to give 
claimants the benefit of the doubt. Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 25: Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada and the Immigration and Refugee BoardThe Processing of Refugee Claims, Report of the 
Auditor General of Canada, (December 1997), 25.59.  
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government, and IRB proceedings continued to provide rejected claimants administrative and 
court appeals through an in-country post-determination process. Furthermore, Bill C-11 codifies 
in the law that all claimants are entitled to a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) in order to 
ensure that if they are removed, they do not face risk of torture or persecution, as defined by both 
Canadian and international legal interpretation.337 Moreover, according to Stephen Gallagher, Bill 
C-11 [did] not significantly limit judicial review of IRB and Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC) decision-making. When the US, UK, and Australia (among others) reformed their 
refugee systems during the 1990s, significant limitations on judicial appeals were core elements 
of reform.338 Furthermore, Canada uses an expanded definition of protection under the IRPA 
which makes explicit reference for the first time in Canadian Immigration law to Canadas 
international obligation under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).    
  However, the IRPA does contain new provisions that impact on the procedural rights 
of refugee claimants. Bill C-11 expands the powers of arrest and detention and creates new 
grounds of inadmissibility to Canada. Appeals have been restricted and the security certificate 
procedure has been condensed. The Immigration and Refugee Board will also be altered by the 
new legislation. Refugee hearings will be conducted by a single member and all relevant risks 
to the claimant will be considered at one hearing. Repeat refugee claims will no longer be 
permitted and a new Refugee Appeal Division will be created to ensure consistent 
jurisprudence and a reduced reliance on lengthy Federal Court proceedings. The IRPA expands 
the grounds for which refugee claims are ineligible339. Applicants who have received removal 
orders for reasons of security, human or international rights violations, serious criminality or 
organized criminality will be ineligible for an IRB hearing and will be unable to appeal to the 
Refugee Appeal Division. The Refugee Protection Division and the Refugee Appeal Division 
                                                        
337 Stephen Gallagher, Canadas Dysfunctional Refugee Policy: A Realist Case for Reform, Behind the 
Headlines, vol.58, no.4, (summer, 2001), 2. 
338 For example, Australia detains all in-land refugee claimants until their identities are established. See, 
Stephen Gallagher, The Open Door Beyond the Moat, 101. 
339 IRPA, s.101(f).  
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can suspend their consideration of a claim at any stage on these same grounds.340 All of these 
procedures, along with the restriction of appeal rights for serious criminals and those who pose 
a security risk, are intended to expedite decisions and removals.  
 The IRPA has specific preventative security measures related to refugees. It expands 
the provisions concerning detention without warrant and extends the power to arrest and detain 
refugee claimants who cannot establish their identity anytime during the refugee determination 
process. Refugee claimants can be detained if they refuse to co-operate with measures to 
establish their identity.341 They may also be detained upon entry if the officer believes it 
necessary to complete an examination or if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that 
they are inadmissible on grounds of security. Refugee Detention may be continued if the 
Immigration Division member is satisfied that:  they are a danger to the public; they are 
unlikely to appear for further proceedings; the Minister is taking steps to inquire into a 
reasonable suspicion that they are inadmissible on grounds of security; or the Minister is of the 
opinion that identity has not been established and is making reasonable efforts to do so.  If the 
officers are not satisfied as to a claimants identity or have concerns that the individual may 
pose a security risk, they have the discretion to detain the person. The exercise of such 
discretion is probably preferable to automatic detention, which can result in innocent people 
being deprived of their liberty. Thus, the IRPA provides the Immigration Division member 
discretion to provide alternatives to detention.342 The IRPA also provides a specific statutory 
definition for a serious crime committed in Canada. Serious criminality for the purpose of 
inadmissibility is now defined a crime that was punishable in Canada by a term of 
imprisonment of at least two years.343 This procedural change was accompanied by the 
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elimination of the requirement that the Minister issue a danger opinion before deportation 
proceedings are initiated for refugee claimants convicted of a serious crime in Canada.  
These examples demonstrate how due process measures for refugee claimants have been 
changed in order to facilitate expedited and clarified processing requirements. The tightening of 
inadmissibility provisions in Bill C-11 clearly demonstrates that the government sees increasing 
processing efficiency as a crucial way to enhance security elements in the refugee system.  
Furthermore, changes to the ineligibility criteria and the fact that under Bill C-11 a refugee 
claim rejected on criminal or security grounds produces an automatic removal order, made it 
appear as though the IRPA establishes more stringent access to Canadas refugee determination 
system.   
However, as Gallagher states, [a]lthough technically available to the Canadian refugee 
system, practices such as safe third countries, safe country of origin, or internal flight option, 
routinely applied by other industrialized countries to allow for expedited removal, are rarely 
applied in Canada.344 Furthermore, historically, 95 percent of all initial refugee claims have 
been forwarded to the IRB for a full hearing, and now with the IRPA, all failed claimants will 
be assessed under the consolidated protection grounds of the PRRA for the risk they would 
face if removed.345 Even failed claimants who are denied refugee status due to security and 
serious criminality reasons will have the Ministers delegate for a PRRA balance the risks 
he/she faces against the nature and severity of the acts he/she committed and the potential 
danger to Canada. A positive decision will result in a stay of removal but not protected status. 
A negative decision will result in deportation. The inclusion of the PRRA in the IRPA ensures 
that Canada cannot limit access to its borders to genuine refugees nor can it exclude and deport 
non-citizens who face the risk of refoulement, the return of people to a place where they would 
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345 Ibid.,  
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face persecution under the UN Refugee Convention, and helps to ensure that the IRPA does not 
constitute a fundamental change to Canadas refugee determination system.     
  
5.3 Findings Regarding Whether the IRPA Strikes a Right Balance Between 
      Safeguarding the Rights of Refugees and Protecting Canada 
 
Importantly, the IRPA framed the meaning of protection in modern Canadian 
immigration law and regulations as supporting the idea that Canada is a nation that will protect 
persons in genuine need of protection. On the other hand, the IRPA also explored the, at the time, 
less topical issue of what measures the Canadian state should enact to protect its own citizens 
from the threat that refugees might pose. Importantly, the IRPA did not demonize refugees as a 
threat to the nation. In fact, the government went out of its way to emphasize Canadas 
commitment to refugee rights by linking the concept of protection in the title of the new Act to 
part two of the legislation entitled Refugee Protection.  
However, the IRPA fails to clarify the grey area of procedural rights associated with 
security certificates. This measure in particular has disturbed refugee advocates and others who 
believe that the Canadian government has been too restrictive in the way that it has exercised this 
procedure. Refugee advocates charge that it is more important to guard against the infringement 
of the individuals right to protection than to let the state exercise its right to defend state security 
with extra-legal procedures that only apply to non-citizens. The contradictory nature of the 
refugee/security nexus has been evident in the example of security certificates because non-
citizens are detained without being brought to trial or even charged, ostensibly in order to protect 
the security of citizens. Moreover, under a security certificate, the government can limit access to 
the evidence on which the allegations are made to both the accused and his or her lawyer. The 
IRPA does not address the procedural validity of detaining individuals indefinitely in the absence 
of the legal principles of beyond reasonable doubt and full disclosure of evidence. Because 
the security certificate process only applies to non-citizens, it has become a litmus test under the 
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IRPA of how the government has reconciled the protection rights of individuals against the 
security of the state.  
However, court rulings, common practice, and Canadas adherence to the Convention 
Against Torture make it very difficult for the government to deport anyone found inadmissible on 
a security certificate if they face the risk of torture. Furthermore, almost all security certificate 
cases have been appealed to the Supreme Court. In adjudicating the cases it has weighed the 
protection rights of non-citizens versus the right of the state to protect citizens and uphold 
national security using a lesser burden of proof. The security certificate process, like other 
security measures in the IRPA that affect refugees, for the most part maintains the due process 
and procedural rules already established  in previous legislation.  
 
5.3.1 The Ethics of Striking a Balance Between Refugee Protection and National 
         Security in the IRPA   
 
Critics of security provisions in Canadian immigration law point to the fact that refugees 
as non-citizens are subject to differential treatment under the law in Canada.  Chapter two of this 
thesis examines the meaning of protection in regard to the refugee/security nexus and the 
principles that have governed its interpretation in Canadian and international law. On the one 
hand, Canadian immigration law and policy has supported the idea that Canada is a nation that 
must protect persons in genuine need of protection. On the other hand, Canadian policy and law 
have demarcated certain asylum seekers as not eligible for Canadas protection, either because 
they are not considered genuine refugees or because they are considered a threat to Canadian 
security. This dichotomy reveals that Canadian law has affirmed the idea of sovereignty along 
with a commitment to protect refugees.  
Moreover, both the enforcement of state sovereignty and the demands asylum seekers 
place on that sovereignty are inescapable elements of the refugee/security nexus. One side of this 
issue is often associated with the proponents of refugee rights who are concerned with civil 
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liberties, human rights, and the concept of individual sovereignty represented by the doctrine of 
liberal cosmopolitanism. The other side of this issue is associated with supporters of 
communitarian principles who are concerned with ensuring community and group rights of a 
society to determine whom to accept as new members. Both communitarians and liberal 
cosmopolitans agree that individuals who lack a state that protects their rights consequently have 
the right to receive protection from another state; this is the definition of a Convention refugee 
and is recognized in international law. Furthermore, Howard Adelman explains that both 
theoretical positions acknowledge that when it comes to refugees:  
Unlike immigrants, the state does not make a choice in deciding to admit the 
individual. Rather the state is obliged to admit such individuals into its protection 
provided that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her home 
state from organs of the state, or that the state is incapable or unwilling to provide 
such protection.346  
 
However, the exclusion clauses of section E and F of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Refugees provide an exception to the above principle for both of liberal and communitarian 
philosophical theories. These clauses allow individuals to be excluded from states if they pose a 
threat to that states security and are meant to be applied against individuals who are a threat to 
democratic and social institutions that underpin the very conditions of liberty in a host-country. 
However, the commitment to the rule of law in liberal democracies demands that before an 
asylum seeker is denied entry on security grounds, it must be proven that they pose a genuine 
threat. A hypothetical possibility is not a good enough reason to bar entry; furthermore, the 
reasons for barring entry must be supported by evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all. 
Although a serious threat to national security justifies excluding individuals, both political 
theories discussed above call in one way or another for exclusionary grounds to be balanced 
against fundamentally important societal values within a receiving-state.  As Gibney explained, 
the responsibility of states to protect their own citizens interests, their personal safety and 
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security being one of the most important, constrains how states will approach the refugee/security 
nexus.  
For example, under the IRPA, the Canadian state did not reverse the Singh decision, 
which stated that the right of refugee claimants in Canada to have an oral hearing was required as 
a basic principle of fundamental justice. Therefore, in Canada, a refugee hearing must include, a 
hearing notice to the subject of the case to be met and the opportunity of the subject to 
respond.347 The sole exception to this principle is for refugee claimants identified as security 
risks, and this is most evident in Bill C-11s exclusion clauses and the security certificate 
process. Yet, these security clauses themselves demonstrate that the refugee/security nexus also 
involves deeply held Canadian values related to the idea of sovereignty. These concepts remain 
incorporated in the definition of protection in the IRPA and point to the fact that the IRPA 
upholds the balance between safeguarding the rights of refugees and protecting the state which 
has been established and accepted by Canadians through their immigration law.   
 
5.4 Findings Regarding the Need to Reform the Security Certificate Process  
      in the  IRPA and to Review Security Provisions in the Refugee System 
 
On balance, the IRPA strikes a reasonable balance in protecting refugees and the security 
of Canadians.  And it is difficult to argue that the IRPA tipped the balance between maintaining 
an open and procedurally fair refugee system and a refugee system that excludes and removes 
dangerous individuals who try to gain entry into Canada through it. However, neither the IRPA 
nor the Immigration Act represents an example of perfect legislation when it comes to addressing 
the problems associated with the refugee/security nexus.  On the one hand, the IRPA could do a 
better job of dealing with the issue of security certificates; this is an issue that in my estimation is 
undermining the legitimacy of the IRPA.  This is also related to the issue of the government using 
the concept of sensitive evidence to file for the non-disclosure of security related evidence in 
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order to bar entry or remove dangerous and risky people. On the other hand, the matter of 
improving security provisions in the refugee system was not fully addressed by the IRPA and 
may in fact not have a legislative solution. 
      
5.4.1 The Need to Reform Security Certificates 
This process used by Federal judges to determine the reasonableness of a security 
certificates needs to be improved. Upon referral, the designated judge has seven days to review 
the information and any other evidence, and must determine whether it is relevant to the issue 
of the persons inadmissibility and whether it can be released without damaging national 
security. The judge then prepares a summary of the information or evidence so the appelants 
are able to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate, but 
must ensure that information that would be injurious to national security or to the safety of 
any person if disclosed, remains confidential (IRPA s 78h). According to section 78(e) of the 
IRPA, the judge may be required to hear all or part of the information or evidence in secret 
(without the presence of person named in the certificate or their counsel), if they believe that its 
disclosure would threaten national security.  
 This kind of policy also applies to applications for non-disclosure of information made 
by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness under section 86(1) of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). It applies to both the Immigration Division 
(ID) and the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada (IRB). Among the cases heard by the ID and IAD are cases dealing with criminal 
activity and threats to national security. The Minister's evidence in these cases may consist of 
confidential criminal and security intelligence information and other information obtained from 
a source in Canada or from a foreign government or international body.  When the Minister 
makes an application for non-disclosure of information in a detention review or an 
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admissibility hearing before the ID or an appeal before the IAD, these Divisions apply the 
procedure followed by the Federal Court in security certificate cases and may adapt it as 
required by the circumstances. Information and other evidence that are relevant to decide the 
person's release, admissibility or appeal cannot be disclosed to the person if, in the member's 
opinion, doing so would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person.348  
 In both of these circumstances, the right of the person to know the case he or she has to 
meet is denied, a violation of a fundamental tenet of natural justice. Moreover, these procedures 
lack an effective mechanism to challenge the credibility of secret evidence since neither judges 
nor immigration adjudicators are necessarily specialists in security matters. In Charkaoui v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, the Supreme Court of Canada has explained 
the importance of providing these elements of due process to non-citizens: 
The right to a fair hearing comprises the right to a hearing before an independent 
and impartial magistrate who must decide on the facts and the law, the right to 
know the case put against one, and the right to answer that case. While the IRPA 
procedures properly reflect the exigencies of the security context, security 
concerns cannot be used, at the s. 7 stage of the analysis, to excuse procedures 
that do not conform to fundamental justice. Here, the IRPA scheme includes a 
hearing and meets the requirement of independence and impartiality, but the 
secrecy required by the scheme denies the person named in a certificate the 
opportunity to know the case put against him or her, and hence to challenge the 
governments case. This, in turn, undermines the judges ability to come to a 
decision based on all the relevant facts and law. The judges of the Federal Court, 
who are required under the IRPA to conduct a searching examination of the 
reasonableness of the certificate, in an independent and judicial fashion and on 
the material placed before them, do not possess the full and independent powers 
to gather evidence that exist in an inquisitorial process. At the same time, the 
person named in a certificate is not given the disclosure and the right to 
participate in the proceedings that characterize the adversarial process. The result 
is a concern that the judge, despite his or her best efforts to get all the relevant 
evidence, may be obliged, perhaps unknowingly, to make the required decision 
based on only part of the relevant evidence. Similar concerns arise with respect to 
the requirement that the decision be based on the law. Without knowledge of the 
information put against him or her, the person named in a certificate may not be 
in a position to raise legal objections relating to the evidence, or to develop legal 
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arguments based on the evidence. If s. 7 is to be satisfied, either the person must 
be given the necessary information, or a substantial substitute for that 
information must be found. The IRPA provides neither.349 
 
In the same ruling, the Supreme Court declared that while protecting Canadas national security 
and related intelligence sources is a substantial objective, and the non-disclosure of evidence at 
certificate hearings is rationally connected to this objective, less intrusive alternatives, notably the 
use of special counsel to act on behalf of the named persons could be used to better protect 
individuals while keeping critical information confidential. Chief Justice Beverley MacLachlan 
stated: 
Why the drafters of the legislation did not provide for special counsel to 
objectively review the material with a view to protecting the named persons 
interest, as was formerly done for the review of security certificates by SIRC and 
is presently done in the United Kingdom, has not been explained. The special 
counsel system may not be perfect from the named persons perspective, given 
that special counsel cannot reveal confidential material. But, without 
compromising security, it better protects the named persons s. 7 interests.350   
Special counsels should be a part of the security certificate process and for each case under the 
IRPA where the Minister makes an application for non-disclosure of information. This would 
help to shore up a glaring perception among many that the government has bought additional 
security for Canadians by infringing on fundamental rights of non-citizens.   
 
5.4.2 The Need to Review Security Provisions in the Refugee System  
From a security standpoint it is hard to argue that the IRPA dramatically improved 
Canadas security, even with enhanced screening measures and expanded grounds for detention. 
Realistically, refugee claimants who could pose a threat to national security may not be on 
                                                        
349 Judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada, available at: http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2007/2007 
scc9/2007scc9.html (last visited May 8, 2007).  
 
350 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, available at: http://scc.lexum. 
umontreal.ca/en/2007/2007scc9/2007scc9.html, (last visited September 5, 2007). 
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security watch lists and, therefore, could still be released into Canadian society until their claim is 
heard, which could takes months. As Martin Collacott explains:  
It may be sometime before it is known if they have terrorist connections and by 
then it may be difficult even to locate them, quite apart from determining what 
kind of activities they have been involved in. A significant proportion of refugee 
claimants do not, in fact, bother to show up for their refugee hearing and their 
whereabouts usually remain unknown.351     
 
Moreover, effective security measures are dependent on sufficient resource allocation and 
efficient administrative practices working in tandem to prevent backlogs. The Standing Senate 
Committee on National Security and Defence addressed this point in its 2005 Security Guide 
Book which stated that in 2003-2004, there were 22,681 applicants screened at an initial refugee 
application stage. Still, with added resources, and front-end screening, the median turn around 
time for complete inadmissible briefs was 224 days.352  
The resulting backlogs continue to pose a security risk because they delay screening time, 
which in turn permits individuals to live and work in Canada with virtually no surveillance. 
However, this problem begins with delays in making final determination on asylum applications 
and then is compounded by the problem of delays in removing failed claimants. These delays 
encourage abuse of the asylum determination process as a means to bypass regular immigration 
channels. Currently, the average refugee application is expected to take between 16-18 months.353 
But delays between the referral of claims and RPD decisions are only part of the picture. To this 
must be added all of the post-determination delays. Failed claimants have 45 days after receipt of 
notice after a RPD decision to complete an application for judicial review. The Federal Court, 
moreover, on average takes four months to make a decision on leave applications and an 
additional 12 months to deliver a decision in cases where leave for review is granted.354 The time 
                                                        
351 Martin Collacott, Canadas Inadequate Response to Terrorism: The Need for Policy Reform, 45. 
352 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Canadian Security Guidebook, (2005), 
Digital Document available at: http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-
e/rep03nov04-e.htm. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Josh Frecker, Chapter 3.3.3, Removal Proceedings, in Immigration and Refugee Legal Cost Drivers.  
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required for pre-removal risk assessment, which has been estimated at 7 months on average, and 
to complete the arrangements that must be made before the person concerned can be returned to 
his or her country of origin, causes further delays in the removal of failed refugee claimants.355      
 The most logical solutions to the problem of inland refugee backlogs, which leads to 
delays and strains resources and therefore slows the ability of security services to quickly screen 
inland claimants, would be to reduce access to the system to people who should not be entitled to 
make claims or to require reforms that would ensure much faster settlement of cases so that final 
decisions could be reached within weeks or months, not years. Also, there would probably have 
to be greater use made by the government of detention for failed claimants whose identity or risk 
to national security is in doubt as well as for those ordered removed. All of these measures could 
be addressed in the regulations that govern the act and by increasing resource allocations to the 
inland refugee determination system. A more in depth analysis about these measures than what 
has been presented in this thesis thus far is warranted because they would represent a significant 
shift in relation to Canadas response to the refugee/security nexus.  With few exceptions, Canada 
has been successful in finding the right balance to the refugee/security nexus. However, the 
nature of this problem will require Canadians and their federal government to remain vigilant so 
that the balance that has been struck between individual rights and national security remains in 
place under the IRPA.    
 
 
  
  
                                                        
355 Under the IRPA, these delays may increase with the automatic right of a pre-removal risk assessment, 
which take on average seven months to complete. Furthermore, all rulings can be appealed to the Federal 
Court. See, Allison Hanes, Ottawa slow to deport Rwandan war criminal, National Post, (April 6, 2006), 
A-1 
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